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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a broad consensus within Western ethical systems in support
of the principle of autonomy; to the extent reasonably possible, individuals
should control decisions that affect them.' Based on this principle of
autonomy, doctors are subject to malpractice liability if they fail to obtain
the informed consent of patients prior to medical treatment; they must
inform the patients of the risks2 of and alternatives to medical treatment,
and allow the patient to choose whether to undergo the treatment. However,
the legal system has been slow to apply a similar duty to lawyers. While
lawyers have a professional duty to allow clients to make some choices
during legal representation, 4 they are not required to allow clients to make
many other significant decisions.' It is ironic that the lawyer, who under
our system of legal representation is intended to protect the client's auton-
omy from unjustifiable interference by the state or other individuals, can
become an additional source of interference with the client's autonomy.
This article addresses the question of what decisions the client should control
during legal representation, and the steps that courts are likely to take in
the development of a right of client control.
1. See infra notes 37-47, accompanying text, and sources cited therein.
2. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1984); Unthank v. United
States, 732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211
(1974); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1984); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Jacobs v. Painter, 530 A.2d 231 (Me. 1987). See
also the following statutes which require disclosure of alternative methods of treatment, FLA.
STAT. § 768.46 (1986); MN. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.13 (1985).
4. See infra notes 28-32, cases cited therein, and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., sources cited at notes 23 and 35. Some courts and lawyer professional
codes suggest that the lawyer should allow the client to choose the ends of the representation
and that the lawyer should control the means used to obtain those ends. See sources cited
infra at notes 22-23. An examination of this standard and the cases that purport to apply it
reveal its weaknesses. Courts have difficulty determining what decisions are ends decisions and
what decisions are means decisions, and the cases in this area do not appear to actually apply
the ends/means standard. See infra text accompanying notes 22-36. What courts have done is
to identify specific choices within legal representation that the client is entitled to make. See
infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
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At issue is the role of the lawyer. Should lawyers use their power to
do what they think is best for the client or should they empower the client
to do what the client chooses to do? This article will argue that, in general,
clients should make the significant choices in legal representation, 6 not only
6. Eflmann suggests that people can exercise free choice when: 1) They are aware of
the decisions to be made and that they are entitled to make them; 2) They know the choices
and the costs and benefits of these choices; and 3) They understand their values and emotional
needs. See Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. Rv. 717, 727-28 (1987).
Binder & Price present a helpful model for helping the client to reach decisions. See D.
BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERViWnING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1977). They suggest that lawyers enable clients to make decisions by helping them to consider
"potential solutions, with their probable positive and negative consequences ... ." D. BINDER
& S. PRIcE, supra, at 135.
Binder & Price suggest that the lawyer first identify the potential solutions to a problem.
Then, for each potential solution, the lawyer should identify the legal consequences, the client
should identify the psychological and social consequences, and together they should identify
the economic consequences. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra, at 143-45. They suggest a simple
method of enabling the client to weigh these factors:
When the alternatives are initially presented by the lawyer, they can simultaneously
be jotted down on a piece of paper. All the alternatives, including any mentioned
by the client, are listed horizontally across the page. Under each alternative, there
is a brief description. The description attempts to summarize the essence of the
alternative in terms of its legal consequences.... When all the alternatives have
been listed across the page, spaces are made beneath each alternative for listing the
advantages and disadvantages. As the lawyer and client examine the alternatives, the
lawyer jots down each consequence on the sheet of paper as each consequence is
mentioned. The consequence is listed as either an advantage or disadvantage.
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra, at 184. The client can use the paper to make the decision,
either in the lawyer's office or at home. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra, at 186.
The Binder & Price method appears to be very influential. Their book is in use at 90
law schools. Ellmann, supra, at 781. Their method is taught and advocated in other recent
law school skills textbooks. See e.g., D. GIFFoRD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS, THEORY AND APPLI-
CATIONS (1989); L. RIsKIN & J. WESTBROOK, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (1987). Bellow
& Moulton present a similar model for enabling the client to make decisions. G. BELLOW &
B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY
998-1017 (1978).
The lawyer should explain the alternatives and potential consequences in terms that the
client can understand. This may require different language, depending on the sophistication
of the client. Lawyers should avoid the problem that some medical informed consent forms
create for some patients. One study found that medical informed consent forms were written
in language at the undergraduate or graduate level. Grundner, On the Readability of Surgical
Consent Forms, 302 NEw ENG. J. MED. 900 (1980), cited in Meisel & Roth, Toward an
Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of the Empirical Studies,
25 ARiz. L. REv. 265, 298 (1983).
Client counseling requires more than merely presenting the client with options and allowing
the client to choose. Client counseling requires the lawyer to discuss the risks of various
choices with the client. As one court said in a case in which the client initially opposed
settlement and the attorney did not pursue a discussion of settlement:
The fact the client is initially opposed to settlement does not excuse the duty to
advise and counsel the client about settlement if such advice and counsel is otherwise
appropriate. After all, the lawyer's superior skill and knowledge is what the client
is paying for .... It is not uncommon for the client to have an unwarranted faith
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because of the client's interest in autonomy, 7 but because client control is
likely to improve the quality of legal representation that clients obtain."
Client control of legal representation requires an informed client and an
informed client is likely to supervise an attorney's work more carefully.
Client control would also improve the quality of legal representation because
it would lessen the effects of attorney-client conflicts of interest that are
inherent in most legal representation.9
A difficulty with establishing a rule of client control is identifying what
choices the client should make. Even the simplest legal matter involves
many choices. In representation concerning a dispute, choices include eve-
rything from whether to bring a suit to whether to cite seven or eight cases
for a proposition in a memorandum. In representation concerning a business
transaction, choices include everything from whether to form a partnership
or corporation to what language to use in an employment contract.
This article advocates that courts require lawyers to allow clients to
make those choices which a reasonable person, in what the lawyer knows
or should know to be the position of the client, would want to make. 0 If
a lawyer's failure to allow a client to make such decisions results in a loss
to the client, the lawyer should be subject to malpractice liability." Courts
should also continue to identify specific choices that as a matter of law are
for the client.
It is likely that the next steps in the development of the right of the
client to control legal representation will be the recognition of a duty that
attorneys allow clients to control the significant decisions during negotia-
tion, 2 in both legal disputes and transactions, 3 and to allow clients to
in the righteousness of his position. The lawyer's job is to bring rationality, objectivity
and experience to bear on the matter.
Garris v. Severson, Merson, Berke & Melchior, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(ordered not published) (citation omitted) (attorney represented both defendant and his liability
insurance company).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 37-47.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 48-61.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
11. A few commentators have advocated malpractice liability for the failure to allow the
client to control legal representation. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHxAoE 125 (1974); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and
the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 72-73 (1979) (advocates requiring lawyers "to
obtain informed consent when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved");
Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Auton-
omy 65 N.C.L. REv. 315, 349 (1987) (advocates attorney liability for failure to provide client
with adequate information, but does not advocate specific standards).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 155-200.
13. Most persons who seek a lawyer's counsel.., do not do so for help in resolving
a dispute. Rather, most clients present their lawyers with transactional or planning
problems. These clients may want legal assistance in establishing a joint venture or
in concluding another business deal; in purchasing a home or in planning an estate;
in complying with government regulations or in understanding the tax implications
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choose to pursue mediation and arbitration as alternatives to litigation. 4
Courts are likely to hold lawyers liable for the failure to allow the client
to make these decisions for several reasons.
First, the failure to allow a client to make significant choices during
negotiations and to choose mediation or arbitration could cause the client
to suffer a significant loss. If a trial or negotiation of a transaction is
unsuccessful, and a client, given the opportunity and sufficient information,
would have made a different decision that would have benefited the client,
the failure of the attorney to allow the client to make that choice has
injured the client. 5
Second, generally, a client can competently make the significant choices
that arise in negotiations, and the choice whether to pursue an alternative
means of dispute resolution. Unlike some choices that must be made during
litigation, the major decisions related to negotiation, mediation, and arbi-
tration generally are not urgent, nor are they so technical that the ordinary
client could not make them intelligently.
Third, the imposition of civil liability on an attorney for the failure to
allow the client to choose and control alternatives to litigation would build
on well established precedents that give the client the right to choose whether
to accept an offer of settlement 6 and precedents that give the medical
patient the right to be informed about and to choose alternatives to a
proposed medical procedure.
7
Finally, courts and commentators increasingly recognize the value of
alternative means of dispute resolution, both because of the great cost of
litigation to the legal system and to individuals," and the capacity of
alternative means of dispute resolution to foster reconciliation between
parties. 9 It is likely that more clients, when informed of the advantages of
mediation and arbitration and given the opportunity to choose to pursue
them, would do so, and that more disputes would be resolved through these
methods.
of a particular investment. In the majority of such matters, the client needs to reach
an agreement or understanding with some other person or legal entity. To assist the
client in achieving that type of goal, the lawyer most often will negotiate with the
representative of the other person or entity to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
outcome.
R. BAsmEss & J. HARBAUGH, INTERviEwING, CotrNsEuINa, AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLs FOR
EFCTIvE REPRESENTATION 342 (1990).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 201-54.
15. For a discussion of the difficulty clients are likely to have showing the injury that
an attorney's failure to allow them to choose has caused, see infra text accompanying notes
255-71.
16. See cases cited infra note 32, and infra text accompanying notes 166-82.
17. See cases cited supra note 3, and infra text accompanying notes 66-83.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 208-14 and 234-39.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20 and 240-42.
In recent years, some commentators have objected to proposals that would push litigants
toward alternative means of dispute resolution. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 668 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984). This position is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 243-54.
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Part II of this article will discuss the existing law concerning the right
to control legal representation. Part III will discuss the benefits and risks
of client control. Part IV will propose that courts require attorneys to allow
clients to make those choices that the reasonable client, in what the attorney
knows or should know is the client's position, would want to make, and
that courts continue to identify specific choices that are for the client. Part
V will propose that clients have the right to make some specific decisions
during negotiations, and the right to be informed of and to choose whether
to adopt mediation or arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. It will
also discuss the advantages to the client and the legal system of alternative
means of dispute resolution and the difficult causation problem that would
arise when clients allege that a case would have been resolved more favorably
had they been allowed to control the significant choices.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW: AN AsPnATION OF CLIENT CONTROL, THE
UNHELPFUL ENDs/MEANs STANDARD, AND A FEW SPECIFIC CHOICES
RESERVED FOR THE CLIENT
An examination of the lawyer professional codes and relevant cases
reveals some confusion in the law concerning control of legal representation.
The lawyer codes hold up client control as an aspiration."0 However, those
portions of the code that encourage client control do not require it.21
20. Courts have disciplined attorneys in a few cases for making decisions beyond client
authority. See Silver v. State Bar of California, 13 Cal.3d 134, 528 P.2d 1157, 117 Cal. Rptr.
821 (1974) (attorney executed settlement agreement without client's knowledge or consent); In
re John P. Montrey, 511 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1974) (attorney settled case and permitted judgment
to be entered in amount in excess of his authority and failed to inform client of facts); In re
Stem, 81 N.J. 297, 406 A.2d 970 (1979) (attorney misrepresented to client that suit had been
filed and secretly accepted settlement offer despite client's refusal of the offer); In re Jon H.
Paauwe, 294 Or. 171, 654 P.2d 1117 (1982) (plaintiff's attorney failed to apprise clients of
result of trial).
21. The ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIONAL RFSPoNsIBITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE],
was adopted by the ABA in 1969 and presently regulates lawyers in about half of the states.
See ABA/ANA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1:3. It contains Ethical
Considerations (ECs), which are aspirationa norms, the violation of which will not subject
an attorney to discipline, and Disciplinary Rules (DRs), the violation of which will subject the
attorney to discipline. MODEL CODE, Preliminary Statement.
EC 7-7 encourages lawyers to allow clients to make a broad range of decisions in the
legal representation. It states that lawyers may make decisions:
not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a
client .... But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the
client ....
MODEL CODE, EC 7-7. This appears to leave the important decisions to the client, because
almost any decision in a case may affect the merits or substantially prejudice the rights of the
client. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 65. EC 7-7 gives examples of decisions that belong to
the client: in civil cases, the right to accept settlement offers and the right to wave affirmative
defenses, and in criminal cases, the right to decide what plea to take and whether to appeal.
EC 7-7 does not discuss decisions such as what theory of the case to adopt, what witnesses
to call, and what settlement offers to make, all of which arguably might substantially prejudice
1990]
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The mandatory sections of the lawyer professional codes,2 as well as
the rights of the client.
The Model Code's aspiration of client control, however, is not backed up by its
Disciplinary Rules. For a discussion of the Disciplinary Rules from the Model Code that deal
with client authority, see infra note 22.
The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RUtLs], adopted
by the ABA in 1983, are applicable in most of the states that do not apply the Model Code.
ABA/BNA LAwYEa's MANUAL ON PRoFEssIoNAL CONDUCT § 1:3. The Model Rules do not
contain Ethical Considerations. They contain Model Rules (MRs), the violation of which will
subject a lawyer to discipline. The authors of the Model Rules discuss the meaning of the
MRs in official comments.
MR 1.2 leaves "decisions concerning the objectives of representation" to the client. MR
1.2(a). As the discussion infra at text accompanying notes 24-36 indicates, the question of
what is an objective (or end) of the representation is a confusing one and the objectives of
the representation can be defined very narrowly. Under MR 1.2(a), the lawyer is required to
"consult with the client as to the means by which [the objectives] are to be pursued." The
official comment to MR 1.2 helps to define the control that should exist when lawyers "consult
with the client as to the means." It says:
In questions of means, the lawyer ... should defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected.
MR 1.2, Official Comment [1] (emphasis added). Note that the Comment uses the term
"should," rather than "must". Therefore, in the Model Rules, as in the Model Code, in
general, client control is an aspiration, rather than a rule.
22. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, DR 7-101. The only standard in the Model Code which
subjects attorneys to discipline based on their failure to allow clients to control representation,
DR 7-101 states that the "lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) "[flail to seek the lawful objectives
of his client," and that "where permissible" the attorney may use discretion to "wave or fail
to assert a right or position of his client." Id. This provision reserves ends ("objectives")
decisions for the client, but it is somewhat unclear what decisions it reserves for the lawyer.
The key question is, of course, when is it "permissible" for the lawyer to "wave or fail to
assert a right or position of the client," but the Disciplinary Rules do not give further
explanation. "Where permissible" probably means where permitted by the substantive law of
the jurisdiction. The courts in most jurisdictions state that they leave to the lawyer the "means
decisions." See infra cases cited at note 23.
As discussed supra at note 21, MR 1.2 of the Model Rules leaves the "decisions concerning
the objectives of representation" to the client and requires the lawyer to "consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." MODEL RULES, supra, MR 1.2(a).
The Comment to that section explains the requirement that the lawyer consult the client
concerning means. It states:
Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means
of representation. The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's
professional obligations. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with
the lawyer about the means to be used in pursuing those objectives .... A clear
distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in many
cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking. In questions of
means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues,
but should defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred
and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Law defining the
lawyer's scope of authority in litigation varies among jurisdictions.
Comment [1] to MR 1.2. Under this Comment to the Model Rules, technical decisions
concerning means are for the lawyer to make. As noted supra, note 21, the Comment states
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many cases, 23 attempt to define the line between the client's decisionmaking
authority and that of the attorney in terms of ends and means. The client
is to choose the ends of the representation, and the lawyer is to choose the
means to be used in pursuit of those ends.
There are two major problems with the ends/means division of author-
ity. First, the ends/means line is unclear. In many cases, it will be difficult
to distinguish the ends from the means. As David Luban has said:
[The ends/means rule] assumes a sharp dichotomy between ends
and means, according to which a certain result (acquittal, a favorable
settlement, etc.) is all that the client desires, while the legal tactics
and arguments are merely routes to that result. No doubt this is
true in many cases, but it need not be: the client may want to win
acquittal by asserting a certain right, because it vindicates him in a
way that matters to him; or he may wish to obtain a settlement
without using a certain tactic, because he disapproves of the tactic.
In that case, what the lawyer takes to be mere means are really
part of the client's ends. 24
The difficulty of identifying many decisions as either ends or means decisions
is illustrated by cases in which one court has identified a decision as an
ends decision for the attorney while another court has identified the same
decision as a means decision for the client.21
that lawyers should allow the client to make some of the means decisions.
The Comment does not explicitly state the criteria for determining which means decisions
are for the client but it gives a few examples. The examples of means decisions reserved for
the client-the expense to be incurred and decisions that might adversely affect third parties-
are decisions that the typical client could make intelligently and that are likely to be very
important to the client. These two factors, the ability of the client to make an intelligent
choice, and the importance of the means decision to the client, are probably the proper criteria
for determining who should have responsibility for making decisions under the Model Rules.
The ability of the client to make an intelligent choice and the importance to the client of the
choice, will be most important in determining whether the reasonable client would want to
make the decision at issue. This article advocates that those decisions the reasonable client
would want to make should be reserved for the client. See infra text accompanying notes 147-
50.
23. The division of the realms of client and lawyer decision making has been
variously phrased as ends-means, substance-procedure, strategy-tactics, or objectives-
means. Each grouping probably refers to the same basic division between the goal
toward which steps are taken and the steps themselves.
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Exmcs 156 (1986). For cases adopting the ends/means line of
client/attorney authority and criticism of them, see Spiegel, supra note 11, at 57-58; Strauss,
supra note 11, at 318-20.
24. Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 459 n.9.
Luban also suggests that the reason that paternalism is an issue for professionals is that they
tend by the very nature of their training to view all of their client's problems as technical and
professional ones. Id. at 454.
25. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 11, at 57 n.56-58 (citing Duffy v. Griffith, Co., 206
Cal. App. 2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962); Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co., 235 Cal.
App. 2d 485, 45 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1965)).
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A second difficulty with the ends/means distinction is that clients will
often have many ends, 26 and a means that is designed to meet one end may
conflict with other client ends. 27 It is not sufficient that the client merely
identify a priority of ends. Choices among the means employed will carry
different risks as to each of the ends of the client.
An examination of the lawyer codes and some of the cases which have
presented courts with the issue of client control reveals that courts often
do not follow the ends/means distinction. What they have done is allot the
client some of the specific choices that are commonly made during the
course of legal representation.
In criminal defense cases, courts have identified several decisions that
are for the client. These are summarized in the A.B.A. Standards for
Criminal Justice, which states that the defendant/client is entitled to choose:
(i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and
(iii) whether to testify in [the defendant's] own behalf.
28
Lawyers' professional codes and courts have identified several negotia-
tion decisions in both civil and criminal cases that the client should make.
The attorney must have client approval for any settlement offer.29 The
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement in a civil case30 or a plea
bargain offer in a criminal case' is for the client. In civil cases in which
lawyers have failed to present settlement offers to clients, courts have
imposed liability on the attorneys for failure to keep their clients properly
informed and failure to allow clients to control this choice.
2
26. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 41.
27. For example, a plaintiff may want to settle a case, avoid having to testify, and still
get as much money as possible. Should the lawyer use negotiation tactics that are likely to
gain the highest recovery, but which carry a greater risk of deadlock?
28. 1 A.B.A. ST ARDS FOR CiRAL JUSTICE, ch.4, Standard 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1982) states:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused
and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made
by the accused after full consultation with counsel are:
(i) what plea to enter;
(ii) whether to waive jury trial; and
(iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-
examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made,
and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer
after consultation with the client.
29. See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 23, at 169-72.
30. See cases cited infra note 32.
31. See C. WoLFRAm, supra note 23, at 165 (citing Harris v. State, 437 N.E.2d 44 (Ind.
1982); People v. Whitfield, 40 Ill.2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 850 (1968); State v. Simmons, 65 N.C.
App. 294, 309 S.E.2d 493 (1983)).
32. See, e.g., Whiteaker v. State, 382 N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1986); Joos v. Auto-owners
Ins. Co., 94 Mich. App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443,445 (1979), later appealed, Joos v. Drillock,
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Many of these decisions that courts explicitly leave to the client are
probably best classified as means decisions. In criminal cases, the client's
end is generally acquittal or limitation of the penalty. Whether to try the
case before a jury and whether the client should take the stand and testify
are means choices that may determine whether the client's ends are met,
and yet these decisions are reserved for the client. 33 In civil cases, the client's
end is generally to receive as much, or pay as little, money as possible. An
attorney's independent rejection of an offer may be a means of negotiating
a good settlement, but clients are entitled to decide whether to accept a
settlement offer.
3 4
An examination of the cases that initially adopted the ends/means
distinction between client and attorney authority may explain why courts
adopted it. As Professor Spiegel has pointed out, the ends/means test was
drawn initially in cases in which a third party was trying to bind the client
to a decision made by the client's attorney without client authority. 35 The
127 Mich. App. 99, 338 N.W.2d 736 (1983) (".... an attorney has, as a matter of law, a duty
to disclose and discuss with his or her client good faith offers to settle."); Rubenstein v.
Rubenstein, 31 A.D.2d 615, 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (1968) aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 751, 250
N.E.2d 570, 303 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969) ("failure to disclose an offer of settlement and submit
to the client's judgment for acceptance or rejection is improper practice"); Rizzo v. Haines,
520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989).
The decisions that require attorneys to pass settlement offers to clients can be explained
on two grounds. First, the decision whether to accept the offer is extremely important to the
client. Rejection of a settlement offer may result in litigation, in which the client may obtain
a poorer result than the client would have obtained had the client accepted the settlement
offer. Second, the lawyer is likely to have a conflict of interest with the client over whether
or not the offer should be accepted. If the case is being handled on an hourly basis, it may
be in the interest of the lawyer to reject the offer and continue the employment. If the case
is being handled on a contingency fee basis, it may be in the lawyer's interest to either accept
or reject the offer, depending on the terms of the contingency fee agreement, the anticipated
time required if the case is tried, the amount of the offer, and the likely verdict. Rosenthal
demonstrates that in automobile collision personal injury cases it is generally in the interest
of plaintiffs' attorneys to settle rather than to try cases. D. RosENm.AL, supra note 11, at 98.
A lawyer's decisions may also be affected by the possible publicity if a case is tried. See, e.g.,
Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1989), discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 167-82 and 192.
The problem with the settlement offer rule is not that it is difficult to justify, but that
it is difficult to explain why the client has the right to accept or reject a settlement offer, and
does not have the right to make other key negotiation decisions. Other negotiation decisions
are also important to the client and are likely to present a conflict of interest between the
attorney and the client. The possibility of expanding the right of the client to make decisions
in settlement negotiations to encompass the right to make other decisions related to negotiation
is discussed in a later section. See infra text accompanying notes 155-200.
In addition to giving the client the right to make some decisions, the Model Code and
the Model Rules both impose or the lawyer the responsibility to assist the client in making
decisions. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, EC 7-8; MODEL Rutas, supra note 21, MR 2.1.
33. See supra note 28.
34. See supra note 32.
35. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 57-58 (citing Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d
780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962) (court found that attorney had no authority to stipulate client's
interest in litigation)); see also Harness v. Pacific Curtainwali Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 485, 45
Cal. Rptr. 454 (1965).
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courts bound the client to the decision of the attorney, labeling the decision
made by the attorney a means decision.
It may be that the interests of third parties and the courts in the finality
of decisions justify binding a client to some choices made by the attorney,
but those interests should not be the tail that wags the dog of attorney/
client decisionmaking authority. If an attorney makes a decision for the
client that should have been made by the client, the interests of a third
party may justify binding the client to the decision in an action with the
third party, but the interests of the third party do not justify relieving the
attorney of responsibility to the client. The rules governing a cause of action
by the client against the attorney based on the failure of the attorney to
allow the client to control decisions should protect the interests of clients
in decisionmaking authority. 6
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND PROBLEMS WITH EXPANDED CLIENT CONTROL
A. Justifications for Client Control
1. The Client's Autonomy
Courts should allow clients to control legal representation out of a
concern for the client's autonomy: that is the client's right of self-deter-
mination. One of the purposes of the attorney is to protect the client's
autonomy from interference by the state and other individuals,3 7 and an
attorney should not be another source of interference with the client's
autonomy. Individual autonomy finds support in utilitarian, Kantian, and
Judeo-Christian theories of ethics.3 The attorney and the law should respect
36. For a suggested division of decisionmaking responsibility between the client and the
attorney, see infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
37. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
38. Every moral theory has some conception of equality among moral agents, some
conception according to which we are to regard others as equal to ourselves. For
the utilitarian, equality is represented in the theory by the claim that in calculating
utility the interests of each person are to count equally. For the natural rights
theorist, all persons are assumed to have equal rights. For the Kantian, I may act
only in that way that I am prepared to will all others act. For the religious moralist
we are all children of God.
Corresponding to these notions of equality are various devices for preserving
this fundamental equality in the process of moral reasoning. According to the
utilitarian an action is justified when an impartial observer would view the action
as maximizing the total amount of utility in the given community. For the rights
theorist and the Kantian a justification must be acceptable to each of the individuals
affected. A similar motive underlies the Golden Rule that is found in most major
religious theories.
Underlying the various techniques of moral justification is a prohibition against
treating others in such a way that they cannot share the purposes of those who are
so treating them. And behind this is a conception of the nature of persons as
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the autonomy of the client out of a desire to do good for the client and
out of concern for the goodness of the client.
Respect for the autonomy of the client will be good for the client, in
an instrumental sense, in that it is likely to result in choices that will work
to the benefit of the client. This argument is made in the following section.
39
An additional justification for autonomy is "the intrinsic desirability of
exercising the capacity for self-determination."' 4 As Gerald Dworkin has
said:
[There is value connected with being self-determining that is
not a matter either of bringing about good results or the pleasures
of the process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising
the capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized by
others as the kind of creature capable of determining our own
destiny. Our own sense of self-respect is tied to the respect of
others-and this is not just a matter of psychology. Second, notions
of creativity, of risk-taking, of adherence to principle, of respon-
sibility are all linked conceptually to the possibility of autonomous
action. These desirable features of a good life are not possible
(logically) for nonautonomous creatures. In general, autonomy is
linked to activity, to making rather than being, to those higher
forms of consciousness that are distinctive of human potential.
41
In addition to the fact that autonomy is likely to yield good results and
that the exercise of autonomy is an important aspect of being human,
autonomy provides the client with an opportunity to be good, to make
moral choices and to grow in moral understanding. This aspect of autonomy
independent sources of moral agency. It is as distinct loci of consciousness, of
purposive action, as distinct selves, that others must be respected and taken into
account when each of us decides what he shall do. It is because other persons are
creators of their own lives, are shapers of their own values, are the originators of
projects and plans, that their interests must be taken into account, their rights
respected, their projects valued.
What makes an individual the particular person he is reflects his pursuit of
autonomy, his construction of meaning in his life.
G. DwoRKIN, THE TimORY AND PRAcTIcE OF AUTONOMY 110 (1988).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 48-61. The utilitarian justification for autonomy
is based on the assumption that clients will make the choices that are most to their benefit
and that when autonomous choices which are best for individual clients are multiplied by all
of the choices made by all clients, client control will work to the good of the greatest number.
Of course, it can be argued that many of the choices of clients that are made in legal
representation will work to the detriment of others. Courts attempt to balance the conflicting
interests of parties. Whether or not our legal system ultimately resolves cases in a manner for
the greatest good of the greatest number is a legitimate subject of inquiry, but courts probably
will be in a better position to determine the interests of the parties if attorneys pursue what
their clients perceive to be the clients' interest.
40. G. DwoRKIN, supra note 38, at 112.
41. Id.
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:819
is important, both for Immanuel Kan 2 and those writing from a Judeo-
Christian perspective, such as Thomas Shaffer.
43
For Kant, autonomy was the precondition of moral choice and one who
acted autonomously would act morally. This conclusion followed from
Kant's definition of autonomy as the absence of any influence other than
reason, and his belief that moral decisions would follow automatically from
reason.4 For Kant, therefore, autonomy was more than the ability to make
choices, it was freedom from any influence other than reason. Anything
that interfered with one's ability to act rationally, including one's "incli-
nations and impulses", interfered with one's autonomy and therefore one's
ability to act morally.4 5 Client choice would create the possibility for
autonomous, and therefore moral, choice, but the fact that the lawyer
allows the client to make the choice will not, by itself, lead to client
autonomy. There might be other influences that would interfere with the
client's ability to make the autonomous, rational, moral choice. An attorney
who has a goal of Kantian client autonomy, therefore, will seek not only
to avoid influencing client choices, but will seek to assist clients in freeing
themselves from their "inclinations and impulses" and other influences that
might interfere with their choices.
Thomas Shaffer does not believe a moral choice will automatically flow
from autonomy, but argues that autonomy, in the sense of freedom to
choose, is important because it gives the client the opportunity to make a
moral choice.
[Autonomy] is not only freedom but freedom for. The object of
law office discourse as moral discourse is to serve the goodness of
42. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF Tim METAPHYSICS OF MOP-us (1959) (L. Beck trans.).
43. See Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 No=E DAME LAW. 231
(1979).
44. [T]his "ought" [the moral law] is properly a "would" that is valid for every
rational being provided reason is practical for him without hindrance [i.e., exclusively
determines his action]. For beings who like ourselves are affected by the senses as
incentives different from reason and who do not always do that which reason for
itself would have done, that necessity of action is expressed only as an "ought."
I. KANT, supra note 42, at 67-68.
Kant believed that autonomy not only would lead to morality, but that it was a necessary
precondition to morality. See id. at 59.
Since Kant believed that morality would automatically flow from autonomy, he could
say that his moral principle of universality, that one must act in a way that one could will
that everyone would act, is a principle of autonomy. Id. at 59.
45. When we present examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following
good maxims, and of sympathy and general benevolence even with great sacrifice
of advantages and comfort, there is no man, not even the most malicious villain
(provided he is otherwise accustomed to using his reason), who does not wish that
he also might have these qualities. But because of his inclinations and impulses he
cannot bring this about, yet at the same time he wishes to be free from such
inclinations which are burdensome even to himself.
Id. at 73.
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the client, and many of us feel that there is more to goodness than
autonomy. 46
If attorneys are concerned that the client be autonomous, then they will




Not only should the client control the representation because of the
intrinsic value of client autonomy, the client should control the represen-
tation because client control is likely to yield better results than attorney
control, whether we measure the results based on the subjective goals of
the individual client, or based on goals held by clients generally.4
Client control is likely to provide more satisfying results to the individual
client than attorney control because clients are likely to be the best judges
of their own interests. 49 The choices a client makes may be quite different
than an attorney would expect for two reasons. First, a client may have
different values than the attorney." For example, during negotiations, a
client may prefer that an attorney engage in cooperative bargaining rather
than competitive bargaining, either out of compassion for or a desire to
maintain a good relationship with the opposing party.5' Second, a client
may have different risk preferences than the attorney.12 The client might
have a great fear of going to trial, and prefer negotiation tactics that avoid
a risk of deadlock.
It might be suggested that with a knowledge of the client's goals, the
lawyer will be able to make choices for the client, but clients will often be
unable to quantify the value that they place on various goals. A client may
46. Shaffer, supra note 43, at 247.
47. See id. at 246. For a discussion of the lawyer's role in ethical choices during legal
representation, see infra text accompanying notes 94-101.
48. It might be argued that lawyers make better decisions than clients. As Strauss has
pointed out, this argument is based on three highly questionable assumptions: 1) Lawyers
understand the needs and interests of the client; 2) Lawyers will act to satisfy them; and 3)
Lawyers are uniquely equipped to make them. Strauss, supra note 11, at 328-29.
49. [Bjeing able to shape one's own choices and values makes it more likely that
one's life will be satisfying than if others, even benevolent others, do the shaping.
This is the traditional liberal argument that people are better judges of their own
interests than others.
G. Dwo~iuN, supra note 38, at 111-12.
50. See D. BINDER & S. PRicE, supra note 6, at 148-49; Martyn, Informed Consent in
the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 307, 315 (1985); Spiegel, supra note 11, at 86
(suggesting that client is better decisionmaker because client has better knowledge of relationship
between facts and client's values and objectives).
51. Competitive and cooperative bargaining are discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 184-87.
52. See D. BINDER & S. PRicE, supra note 6, at 149-50; Spiegel, supra note 11, at 100.
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have incompatible goals,53 such as obtaining more money and avoiding trial,
and a choice which increases the likelihood that the client will obtain one
goal may create a risk that the client will fail to achieve the other goal.54
In many cases, it will be impossible for the lawyer to determine what choices
will provide maximum client satisfaction."
When clients control the representation, they not only are more likely
to obtain better results as judged by their subjective standards, but they are
also likely to obtain better results when judged by standards shared by
clients generally, such as financial benefit.5 6 An empirical study conducted
by Professor Rosenthal of the results in automobile personal injury cases,
both those tried and those settled, found that plaintiffs who are actively
involved in decisions concerning their cases obtain higher recoveries than
those that allow their lawyers to control the cases.
5 7
Clients that are involved in decisionmaking in their cases are likely to
obtain better results for several reasons. First, they may ensure that their
attorneys do not neglect their cases. Lawyers that are tempted to spend
time on other matters are more likely to work on a case when a client is
regularly involved in decisionmaking. Second, clients may catch mistakes
that the attorney alone might overlook s.5 Attorneys may think through their
cases more thoroughly when they have to explain alternatives and justify
53. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 149; Spiegel, supra note 11, at 101
(because lawyers cannot know relative weights of competing values of their clients, they cannot
be sure that their decisions will satisfy clients' real needs).
54. For discussions of the subjectivity of the choices, see G. BELLOW & B. MouLToN,
supra note 6, at 1055; D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 148-53; G. HAzARD, ETmcs
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 136-38 (1978).
55. D. BINDR & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 149.
56. Some commentators have advocated client control of legal representation as a means
of stimulating attorney competency. See D. RosNr.mui, supra note 11, at 28; Martyn, supra
note 50, at 310; Spiegel, supra note 11, at 90-92.
57. Rosenthal had a panel of experts calculate the value of 59 automobile personal injury
cases. RosENT.nL, supra note 11, at 36-37. The panel consisted of two experienced plaintiffs'
attorneys, one insurance company adjuster, one insurance company attorney, and one attorney
that had represented both plaintiffs and insurance companies. Id. at 37. Rosenthal did not
consider two cases because there was a substantial deviation as to the value among the panel.
Id. He evaluated the results the attorneys obtained in the remaining 57 cases based on the
valuation of the expert panel. Of the plaintiffs that were actively involved in their cases, 75%
received good results and 25% received poor results. Id. at 57. Of the plaintiffs that were not
actively involved, 41% received good results and 59% received poor results. Id. Rosenthal
found that the most important predictor of good results was follow-up demands for attention
by the client. Id. at 46.
The Rosenthal study evaluated only the effectiveness of clients that, on their own initiative,
were involved actively in their cases. It is likely that clients would be even more effective if
their attorneys initiate and encourage client involvement. Clients who on their own initiative
attempt to get involved in their cases are unlikely to know what involvement will most help
their case. If the lawyer systematically involves the client, this is likely to result in more
effective decisionmaking. For an effective method of client involvement in decisionmaking, see
D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6, at 147-53.
58. See D. RosENrTHA, supra note 11, at 169.
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suggestions to the clients. Third, clients that are actively involved in their
cases may disclose relevant factual information to their attorneys that the
clients might otherwise have thought irrelevant.A9 Finally, the client and the
attorney both bring distinct abilities to the attorney-client relationship, which
may be lost if the attorney controls the representation. 60 The tendencies of
clients toward intuition and feeling can complement the tendencies of
attorneys toward a logical focus on the facts, and may help to make choices
that will provide the greatest benefit to the client.
61
3. Attorney Conflicts of Interest
An additional reason that client control may yield better results than
attorney control is that, in many of the decisions that are made in legal
representation, the client's goals may conflict with those of the lawyer. As
to the unusual, subjective goals of the client, lawyers may have a conflict
because it is in the reputational interest of the lawyer to get what the
community will perceive as a successful result. If client control of a decision
leads to what the community will perceive as a poor result, it may harm
the lawyer's reputation.
In addition to the likelihood that the attorney's interests will conflict
with the unusual goals of the client, the attorney's interests may conflict
with goals that are more common to clients. Attorneys have interests which
conflict with client interests in a number of common situations. For example,
if a lawyer is handling a case on a contingency fee basis, one study has
shown that it is generally in the lawyer's interest to get a quick settlement.
6 2
In such cases, the client's interests might be better served through litigation
or more negotiation. If lawyers are overworked, they will be tempted to
make decisions that will give them less work, and if they are underworked,
they will be tempted to make decisions that will give them more work.6 3 In
addition, some have observed a tendency of corporate attorneys to "over-
deliver" legal services, i.e., to do more work than might be cost effective
for the client.64 In some situations, lawyers are tempted to handle a case in
59. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 103-104.
60. T. SAFF--ER, LEAL IrTERvmwmiN AND CoUNsELIN IN A NUTrsHLL 52-63 (1976).
61. Thomas Shaffer makes this argument based on Jung's theory of psychic function
that each person operates on two spectrums, a thinking/feeling spectrum, and a sensation
(reliance on facts)/intuition spectrum. Id. at 60-63.
62. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 11, at 96-99 ("IFlor all but the largest claims, an
attorney makes less money by thoroughly preparing a case and not settling it early." Id. at
105); Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CoasrEL L. Rav. 529, 536
(1978).
63. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 329-30 (attorneys concern about their "time, profit,
and other personal interests affect, perhaps subconsciously, the choices [they make] for the
client").
64. There is a "tendency in corporate practice to overdeliver legal services .... Lawyers,
especially in New York, travel like Nuns-in pairs or three at a time." See Spiegel, supra note
11, at 99 n.241 (quoting N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1977, at DI, col. 2).
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a way that will get them favorable publicity at the expense of the client. 65
Client control may serve to counterbalance these conflicts of interest.
4. Consistency With Medical Informed Consent
As Jay Katz has pointed out, rules imposing liability on doctors for
medical malpractice have preceded and provided precedent for rules impos-
ing liability on lawyers for legal malpractice.6 Medical malpractice first
developed in the fourteenth century;67 legal malpractice in the eighteenth
century. 6 American courts originally imposed liability on doctors under a
negligence theory for the failure to inform patients of the risks of and
alternatives to surgery in 1960.69 It may be that these medical informed
65. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58, 64 (1989) (where court stated
that there was evidence that lawyer wanted case to go to trial, rather than settle, so that he
could get "a reputation as a negligence attorney").
66. Katz, On Professional Responsibility, CoM. L.J. 380, 384 (Sept. 1975).
67. Id. (citing Y. B. Hill, 48 Edw. III, f.6, pl.11 (1374)).
68. Id. (citing Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767)).
69. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960) (court stated that patient
did not give informed consent to radiation treatment because her physician failed to warn of
hazards involved), reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670; Mitchell v. Robinson, 334
S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960) (court held that "doctors owed their patients, [who are] in possession
of [their] faculties the duty to inform [them] . . . of the possible serious collateral hazards or
[dangers]" of shock therapy), rev'd on other grounds, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675.
The right of informed consent in medical malpractice cases had its origins in battery cases
brought against doctors who failed to inform patients of the risks that accompanied surgery.
The failure to give the patient this information negated the consent and the doctor was subject
to liability for battery. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), rev'd
on other grounds, 80 N.W.2d 859; Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y.
125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), rev'd on other grounds, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 1. Justice
Cardozo stated the basis for thi patient's right as follows:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent, commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 128-130, 105 N.E. at 93-94 (operation performed after patient's
express prohibition).
In the informed consent battery cases, the doctors lacked the malicious intent that
generally accompanies battery and, in 1957, Professor McCoid suggested that the better basis
for liability in such cases was negligence-defined as the failure of the doctor to give the
patient information that a reasonable doctor would give. See McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MInN. L. Ray. 381, 434 (1957). He suggested
that doctors be subject to malpractice liability whenever they treat a patient without informing
the patient of the risks of and alternatives to the treatment given. McCord, supra, at 434.
This suggestion was adopted by Mitchell and Natanson in 1960. Other courts rapidly adopted
negligence as the basis of liability. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex.
1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 496 F.2d 878, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Dunham v. Wright, 302 F. Supp. 1108 (M.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.
1970); Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
In medical malpractice cases, the standard of care was traditionally established by the
general practices of the profession. See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this rule and the comparable rule in legal malpractice cases. Most courts now
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consent cases will provide a precedent for a general duty to allow clients
to control legal representation. This time it should not take the courts four
centuries. The following section will compare the possibility of a client
control cause of action with the present medical informed consent cause of
action.
a. The Interests at Stake: The Right to Control What is Done With
One's Body and the Right to Control What is Done With One's Legal
Rights
The duty to obtain informed consent to medical treatment protects
patients' interest in autonomy and bodily integrity.70 A duty to allow a
client to control legal representation would protect clients' interests in
autonomy and their legal rights. It is understandable that the right of
medical informed consent would develop before a right of client control.
An individual's interest in bodily integrity has been of special legal concern
since the early days of the common-law. 7' Although, in general, courts have
not given one's interest in control of legal rights as much protection as the
interest in bodily integrity, one's legal rights often protect interests that
have a high priority within our society, such as personal liberty or child
custody.
One might argue that the interest at issue in most legal representation
is not as important as liberty or child custody, but is merely a matter of
money. Money is an important commodity, especially to those who do not
have much, but the interest at stake in the client control cases is of far
greater concern than the amount of money at issue. It is a matter of the
client's legal rights, and who controls the pursuit of those rights. The
American colonies fought the American Revolution, not because they were
taxed, a mere financial matter, but because they were taxed without rep-
resentation, a matter of financial rights. Additionally, the Constitution,
legislatures, and courts in this country have taken great steps in protecting
the ability of people to defend their legal rights. For example, the Section
1983 cause of action,12 recognized by Congress, and given an expansive
require the doctor to disclose material risks, those of which the reasonable patient would want
to be informed. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
The medical informed consent cases present a difficult cause-in-fact issue. Even if a
doctor fails to inform a patient of risks of or alternatives to surgery and the patient suffers
harm from the surgery, the failure of the doctor to give the patient the information did not
cause the loss unless the patient would not have had the surgery in light of the risks or
alternatives. This cause-in-fact issue is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 255-71 in a
section which deals with the similar cause-in-fact problems that would arise in some client
choice cases.
70. See, e.g., Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formulation
of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. RaV. 124, 129 (suggesting that right to informed
consent in medical cases is based on high value of personal integrity).
71. See, e.g., Cole v. Turner, 6 Modem Rep. 149, 90 Eng. Rep. 958 (Nisi Prius 1704).
72. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988).
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reading by the federal courts, 73 protects the right of citizens to pursue legal
remedies. The due process clause of the Constitution protects the right of
people to due process of law.74 The issue in client control cases is the
question of who controls those rights, and the possessor of the rights should
have control over what is done with them.
b. The Doctor's and the Lawyer's Conflict of Interest
In both the doctor/patient and the lawyer/client relationship, the profes-
sionals are subject to conflicts of interest when presented with alternative
means of handling a case.75 It will be in the interest of doctors and lawyers
to choose the method that will be most financially rewarding to them. The
doctor's financial interest may push the doctor toward adopting the more
intrusive, and more expensive, treatment. The lawyer's financial interest
may push the lawyer who is being paid on a contingency fee basis toward
a quick settlement; it may push the lawyer who is being paid on an hourly
basis to spend an excessive amount of time on a case. 76
Even doctors and lawyers who are not motivated by material rewards
are subject to conflicts of interest. They may favor a choice that would be
in the interest of society, but not in the interest of the individual patient
or client. A doctor who is developing a new medical technology will want
to use it. Similarly, a lawyer who has a good test case that may establish
the rights of the poor will want to litigate it. These factors are likely to
affect a professional, whether consciously or unconsciously, 77 and the con-
flict of interest justifies the right of patients to control their medical
treatment and the right of clients to control their legal representation.
c. The Ability of the Lawyer and Doctor to Communicate and the
Ability of the Client and Patient to Understand
In some respects, there may be a stronger case for client control of
legal representation than for patient control of medical treatment. One
objection that might be raised to imposing a duty on the doctor to obtain
informed consent is that doctors are not skilled, necessarily, in the ability
to communicate. They are skilled at treating disease. Lawyers, on the other
hand, generally must have good communication skills. They must be able
to convey to others difficult concepts in understandable language, whether
73. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979), remanded, 474 F. Supp. 901, aff'd, 661 F.2d 940 (1981); Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d
157 (7th Cir. 1985); Heyn v. Board of Supervisors, 417 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1976).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. The conflict of interest lawyers have in negotiation decisions is discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 156-61. The conflict of interest lawyers have in the choice whether
to adopt mediation or arbitration is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 232-33.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
77. See Schneyer, supra note 70, at 136-37 (arguing that fact that doctors will gain
financially consciously or unconsciously will affect their judgment).
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they are arguing before a judge or jury, negotiating with another attorney,
or interviewing a client. These communication skills should enable the lawyer
to explain to a client the risks and benefits of alternative methods of
handling a case, whereas the doctor may have difficulty explaining the risks
and benefits of alternative methods of medical treatment.
In addition to the fact that the lawyer may be better able to communicate
than the doctor, many legal issues are more understandable to the layperson
than are many medical issues. 7 For example, the factors to be considered
when determining tactics during negotiation or when deciding whether to
pursue an alternative means of dispute resolution are generally within the
understanding of the layperson.7 9 In the medical malpractice cases, however,
the choice between alternative methods of medical treatment may require
an understanding of much more difficult technical concepts. 0
d. The Extent of the Loss if There is a "Poor" Choice by the Patient
or Client
This article is premised on the belief that, in general, people should
have a right of autonomy. There is, however, great controversy as to
whether people should have the right to make choices that place them at
risk of death or serious injury. Some laws prevent people from exposing
themselves to risks.8 ' For example, there are laws which require vehicle
occupants to wear seat belts and laws which prohibit the sale of medical
drugs before the approval of the United States Food and Drug Administra-
tion. However, under the doctrine of informed consent, a patient is entitled
to make choices that may present great risk of loss of life.8
2
By comparison, a client's choices during legal representation generally
do not create risks of the magnitude that a patient's choices during medical
care create because choices made in the course of legal representation are
not generally a matter of life and death. 3 It may be that, in this respect,
78. See Peck, A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent In Legal Matters, 44
LA. L. REv. 1289, 1296 (1984).
79. This article advocates that clients be allowed to make such decisions. For a discussion
of the ability of the client to understand negotiation decisions, see supra text accompanying
notes 162-65.
80. Cf. Note, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatments: Battery or
Negligence? 34 S. CAL. L. Rav. 217, 223-24 (1961) (doctors suggest that patients may not be
able to understand).
81. This conflict arises in many cases, including right to die cases. See, e.g., Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); In re Quinlan, 70 J.J. 10,
355 A.2d 647 (Me. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922; Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
82. See Comment, Informed Consent: The illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EMoRY L.J.
503, 516 (1974) (discussing sanctity of life issue in medical informed consent cases).
83. In those cases in which the client is a criminal defendant charged with an offense
that carries the risk of the death penalty, the choices made can be a matter of life or death.
Courts have already held that the criminal defendant has the right to accept or reject plea
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there is a greater justification for leaving legal choices to clients than
medical choices to patients, because the loss that the client might suffer
would be less if the client makes an unwise choice than the loss that the
patient might suffer if the patient makes an unwise choice.
B. Objections to Client Control
1. The Risk of a Poor Choice
Several objections can be raised to client control of legal representation.
One is the risk that the client will make a poor choice. An attorney might
believe that a client choice is a poor choice for one of two reasons. First,
the attorney might disagree with the client's goals.14 The argument that
clients do not know what goals are good for them and that they should be
denied the right to make choices on that basis is paternalistic. It runs
counter to the traditional liberal belief that individuals are the best judges
of their own interests. Paternalism is contrary to respect for autonomy, and
the argument for client autonomy is made in an earlier section."
Attorneys might also argue that a client might make choices in technical
matters that are not likely to achieve the goals of the client.8 6 Many of the
decisions that materially affect the client will require a consideration of
both technical legal issues and the goals of the client. Choices made during
legal representation should be both technically wise and consistent with the
client's ends.
There are two ways to make a wise technical choice that is consistent
with the goals of the client. The lawyer can attempt to determine the goals
of the client, so that the lawyer can make technical decisions in light of the
client's goals, or the lawyer can explain the risks of the alternatives to the
client and allow the client to make the decision in light of the client's goals.
The lawyer should allow the client to choose either of these two methods,
but generally, the second method is preferable. Clients are likely to have
multiple goals, some of which may justify different choices. In many cases,
it will be unlikely that the client can quantify the importance of each goal
bargain offers. See supra note 31. This article proposes that the client in a criminal case be
entitled to determine whether to initiate plea bargain discussions. The choice by the client to
pursue a plea bargain, of course, would be a choice for a less risky alternative, unlike a case
in which the patient might choose a risky option.
84. The term "goal" here is used in the broadest possible sense to mean anything that
the client desires. It includes "goals" that the cases and lawyer professional codes would not
normally consider to be an end of the representation. See supra notes 22-23. For example, the
client's desire not to embarrass an opposing witness would be a goal, as used here, though
the lawyer codes would not consider this an end of the representation.
85. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
86. For a discussion of whether the lawyer should control decisions in light of the
lawyer's greater technical knowledge, see Speigel, supra note 11, at "100-04.
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in a way that will enable the lawyer to make the choice that yields maximum
client satisfaction.
87
In most cases, lawyers can explain choices in a manner that will enable
clients to make intelligent choices. Lawyers are skilled at presenting technical
information in understandable language. There will be limits, however, to
the ability of the client to understand technical legal information. Studies
of medical informed consent practices show that at some point, patient
understanding diminishes as doctors present more information.88 The issue
of how much information to give a client is complicated because the point
at which additional information becomes counterproductive will vary from
client-to-client, depending on the sophistication of the client, and will vary
from issue-to-issue, depending on the technical difficulty of the issue. In a
later section, this article advocates that the right of the client to control
legal representation should vary with the complexity of the issue and the
sophistication of the client; that the client should be entitled to make those
choices which a reasonable person, in the position which the lawyer knows
or should know the client to be in, would want to make.89
2. The Urgency of Some Decisions
A second objection that can be made to client control of legal repre-
sentation is that, especially in litigation, many decisions must be made
quickly and it would be very difficult to have the client make them. Many
decisions must be made in the heat of trial and it would create a great
burden on the court system, and in some cases harm the interests of the
client, to have to recess a trial to enable the client to make the decisions.
For these reasons, the right of the client to choose should not extend to
decisions that must be made in the heat of a trial. However, many of the
issues that arise during a trial should be anticipated by the attorney and
discussed with the client prior to trial. 90
This article proposes that the client have the right to make the significant
decisions in negotiation 9' and the right to choose to pursue mediation or
arbitration. 92 These decisions generally are not urgent and the client can
resolve them without damaging the interests of the client or the legal system.
87. See D. BINER & S. PRicE, supra note 6, at 148-49.
88. See Smith, Myocardial Infarction-Case Studies of Ethics in the Consent Situation,
8 Soc. Sci. MED. 399 (1974), cited in Martyn, supra note 50, at 315.
The duty to warn in products liability cases creates the same difficulty. At some point,
additional warnings dilute the effectiveness of prior warnings. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher,
& Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation
Comes of Age, 61 Cosrau. L. REv. 495, 514-16 (1976).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
90. For a discussion of the decisionmaking authority a client should generally have, see
infra text accompanying notes 147-50.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 155-200.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 201-54.
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3. The Risk of Illegal and Unethical Decisionmaking
It might be argued that if courts give clients the right to control the
representation, they will make illegal and unethical choices. "Illegal choices"
here refers to choices that violate the law or the lawyer codes of professional
conduct. "Unethical choices" refers to choices that violate broader ethical
standards. The problem of the risk of illegal choices is easily resolved.
Client control of the representation should not lead to illegal choices. Under
the lawyer codes of professional conduct, the lawyer is and should be
required to refuse any requests that violate the law or the lawyer codes. 93
The more difficult problem concerns choices that are not prohibited by
law or the lawyer codes, but which raise ethical concerns. Examples are
whether an attorney should subject an opposing witness to degrading cross-
examination that might undercut the credibility of the witness, and whether
in negotiation of a settlement an attorney should take advantage of the
fears of the other party that litigation would reveal embarrassing informa-
tion. Even the basic question of whether to assert a legal claim that would
work to the disadvantage of another person involves an ethical choice.
Almost all legal representation raises ethical issues.
94
As to whether the lawyer or the client should control ethical choices
that arise in legal representation, several points are worth making. First, it
may be very difficult to determine what is the proper ethical choice. Recall
that these are choices that the lawyer professional codes have not resolved.
The choices are likely to be difficult, and people disagree over what is
ethical. That is not to say that there are not objective ethical standards,
but only that no one has a perfect ability to discern those standards or to
determine how they should apply.
93. The ABA Model Rules and Model Code encourage client decisionmaking, see supra
text accompanying notes 20-22, but prohibit the lawyer from taking actions that are illegal or
would violate the professional rules. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, DR 7-102(A)(8); MODEL
RULEs, supra note 21, MR 1.16(a)(1).
94. [L]aw office conversations are almost always moral conversations. This is so
because they involve law; law is a claim which people make on one another-a
claim resting on obligation, a moral claim-and one upon which they may seek the
sanction and coercion of the state. In this derivative sense, a conversation about
rights and duties is by definition a moral conversation. A conversation of this sort
also usually involves issues on what to do about rights and duties, and of conse-
quences to third persons. Often the moral content is implicit-whether to file a claim
for damages for physical injury, whether to probate one's father's will-but moral
content is always present. The claim for damages or the distribution of a dead
person's property rests on normative considerations as well as objective rules. And
when one takes advantage of the rule, he has decided that he ought to take advantage
of it. He might have decided that he ought not. Law office choices and decisions
often involve consideration of the social effect of what clients do, and of an effect
on the character of a particular institution, such as a family or a business within
the civil community. If it is possible for a serious conversation, between a lawyer
and a client, in a law office, to be without moral content, I cannot think of an
example.
Shaffer, supra note 43, at 232.
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Second, clients may make decisions that are more ethical than those
attorneys would make. We should not assume that clients will necessarily
make a self-serving choice.95 Clients have ethical values and may act in
accord with them. 96 In fact, it is possible that lawyers make choices on
behalf of a client that are less ethical than the client would make for
himself. When attorneys are faced with ethical issues that are not controlled
by the law or professional rules, it is likely that they will make the choices
that they perceive as most beneficial to the client, irrespective of the ethical
implications. It may even be that the lawyer's duty to zealously represent
a client97 requires lawyers to make choices that would benefit the client.
Were clients to control these choices, they might not make the self-serving
choice.
Finally, if the client controls decisions that have ethical implications,
this does not mean that the lawyer has no role in these decisions. The
lawyer's role should be to aid the client in making an informed choice, and
this should include helping the client to consider ethical, as well as legal
and financial implications of a decision.9 8 Lawyers may be able to see ethical
implications of decisions that would escape the client. The professional rules
encourage lawyers to raise and discuss the moral implications of decisions
95. Robert Bastress appears to make this assumption when he states that clients "do not
prescribe moral choices according to some world view that takes into account competing
values." Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J.
LEGoAL PROF. 97 (1985). Bastress advocates that lawyers make an independent ethical judgement
about choices that arise in legal representation, discuss the ethical implications of the choices
with the client, and withdraw if the client falls to satisfy the lawyer's ethical concerns. Id.
96. See T. SHAFFER, AmiaiciA LEGAL Enmcs: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics
39 (1985); Fried, supra note 37, at 1088. Fried says:
[The lawyer should not] assume that the client is not a decent, moral person, has
no desire to fulfill his moral obligations, and is asking only what is the minimum
that he must do to stay within the law. On the contrary, to assume this about
anyone is itself a form of immorality because it is a form of disrespect between
persons. Thus in very many situations a lawyer will be advising a client who wants
to effectuate his purposes within the law, to be sure, but who also wants to behave
as a decent, moral person.
Id.
97. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, DR 7-101(A), states:
A lawyer shall not intentionally ... (f)ail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules....
Professor Simon argues that, when confronted with an ethical issue, lawyers are likely to
make the client-serving choice. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 53-59 (1978).
98. Thomas Shaffer contrasts three views of professional responsibility. The ethics of
role would say that the role of the attorney is as advocate only and that, except for the
restrictions of the attorney codes, the attorney should not be involved in the ethical choices
of the client. The ethics of isolation would say that the attorney should not do anything for
the client that violates the attorney's ethical standards and that the attorney should withdraw
when the client makes what the attorney believes to be an unethical choice. The ethics of care
would say that the attorney should engage the client in ethical discourse about the decisions
and help the client to see the ethical implications of the choices to be made, but that the client
should control the choice. See Shaffer, supra note 43.
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with their clients, 99 and many clients will want their lawyers to help them
to make ethical decisions.100 In the end, if the lawyer believes that the
client's decision clearly is unethical and the lawyer does not want to
participate further, the lawyer can withdraw from the representation. 0'
4. Clients May Want Lawyer Control
Many attorneys do not leave significant choices to the client,'0 and
apparently many clients have not demanded this right. The fact that clients,
who in most cases are paying the bills, have not demanded the right to
control legal representation might generate two very different reactions. One
might argue, as Richard Epstein has argued as to medical patients, 03 that
clients have not demanded control because they do not want control. Or,
one could argue that clients that do not control legal representation do not
realize that they should control it. 104 This article will take the position that
the client should be permitted to allow the attorney to control the repre-
sentation, but only after the attorney presents the opportunity for and
explains the advantages of client control.
First, there is the argument that clients generally do not want the right
to control the representation. Richard Epstein suggests that the fact that
market forces have not produced a contractual right of informed consent
in the doctor/patient relationship indicates that patients do not want such
99. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, EC 7-8, states:
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer
to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well
as legally permissible.
MODEL RuLas, supra note 21, MR 2.1, states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment
and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral ... factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation.
100. As Charles Fried has said:
[I]n very many situations a lawyer will be advising a client who wants to effectuate
his purposes within the law, to be sure, but who also wants to behave as a decent,
moral person. It would be absurd to contend that the lawyer must abstain from
giving advice that takes account of the client's moral duties and his presumed desire
to fulfill them. Indeed, in these situations the lawyer experiences the very special
satisfaction of assisting the client not only to realize his autonomy within the law,
but also to realize his status as a moral being.
Fried, supra note 37, at 1088.
101. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 21, MR 1.16(b)(3), states:
[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client ... if... a client insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.
102. One study found that 30% of the attorneys believe that the lawyer should be in
charge, 52% believe that the lawyer should obtain client consent for important decisions, and
only 18% believe that the client sets the limits. The Lawyer-Client: A Managed Relationship?,
12 ACAD. MomT. J. 76 (March 1969), cited in D. RosNmTA, supra note 11, at 113, n.29.
103. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
87, 127.
104. See supra note 6 for the theory of Binder & Price.
CLIENT CONTROL OF REPRESENTATION
a right; 0 15 if patients wanted the right to make choices in medical care, this
right would have emerged from doctor/patient negotiations.' °6 The same
argument could be made concerning the legal profession; broader client
control has not emerged because clients have not demanded such a right.
However, it is likely that ordinary medical patients and legal. clients do
not think it appropriate to question the decisions of a professional.
0 7 It
may be that patients and clients have not chosen to control medical treatment
and legal representation because doctors and lawyers have not presented
them with these options. 08
Binder and Price suggest counseling methods that would deter clients
from allowing lawyers to influence them. 1°9 They suggest that when a client
has difficulty making a decision, "providing the client with the option of
choice by the lawyer should usually be a last resort,"" 0 and that when
clients ask them for their opinion, "lawyers should refrain from stating
what they would do.""' Binder and Price want attorneys to actively dis-
courage the client from allowing the attorney to control the representation
because of a legitimate concern that the client has come to the attorney
with preconceived notions that the attorney should make the decisions.
However, as one commentator has suggested, Binder and Price would have
the attorney "unilaterally, manipulatively impose the goal of full partici-
pation."112
The right of client control is based on the assumption that, with
sufficient information, the client can make intelligent choices in the repre-
sentation. Client control should extend to the right to have the attorney
make some choices. Attorney control of choices during legal representation
does not violate the client's autonomy as long as the client makes an
informed choice for attorney control." 3 The attorney, however, should make
105. See Epstein, supra note 103, at 95, 127.
106. See id. at 95. Epstein has argued that the amount of information that the doctor
should give the patient should be decided as a matter of contract. See id. at 95, 127.
107. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 79.
108. A Canadian study of 1025 adults found that for 50%, the quality they most desired
in a lawyer is that the lawyer explain the details of their case. See Martyn, supra note 50, at
308 n.4.
109. Binder & Price suggest a method of attorney/client decisionmaking that in many
respects is advocated in this article. See D. BINER & S. PRicE, supra note 6.
110. Id. at 154.
111. Id. at 186.
112. Ellmann, supra note 6, at 743. Ellmann is also critical of what he suggests are Binder
& Price's manipulative techniques for obtaining from the client information that the client
might be reluctant to give. Id. at 735. Eliman states that "(1)awyers who seek to implement
the principle of client decision-making fuliy should offer their clients less intimacy, but more
advice." Id. at 754.
113. Gerald Dworkin makes the following argument:
Someone who wishes to be the kind of person who does whatever the doctor
orders is as autonomous as the person who wants to evaluate those orders for
himself. This view differs from others in the literature. R. P. Wolff, for example,
says (in the context of the citizen and the state) "[t]he autonomous man ... may
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it clear to clients that they have the right to control the significant decisions
in the representation, and they should explain to clients the advantages of
client control."
4
5. The Additional Expense of Client Choice
Client choice is likely to add to the cost of legal representation." 5 The
lawyer will have to spend time educating the client on the law and the
implications of the various options. Is the benefit of client control worth
the cost of the extra attorney and client time involved?" 6 As with other
questions in the representation, the client should resolve this question. As
argued in the prior section," 7 clients should be able to decide what issues
they will control. The lawyer should inform the client about the advantages
of client control and the additional expense that it will require. It is the
client that will bear the expense of the representation, and the client should
decide whether the added expense of client control is worth it."'
IV. POTENTIAL DIRECTIONs FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLIENT CONTROL:
A BROADENED GENERAL STANDARD OR THE CONTINUED IDENTIFICATION OF
SPECIFIC CHOICES FOR THE CLIENT
As noted previously," 9 courts have purported to adopt an ends/means
standard for determining what choices are for the client and what choices
do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it.... By
accepting as final the commands of the others he forfeits his autonomy. but his
conception of autonomy not only has the consequence that no government is
legitimate but also that such values as loyalty, objectivity, commitment, and love
are inconsistent with being autonomous.
G. DwoRKiN, supra note 38, at 108-09 (quoting R. WOLF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCMSM 14
(1970)).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 48-65.
115. See Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest,
95 YALE L.J. 219, 294 (1985); see also supra note 67.
116. Spiegel argues that the benefits of client control are greater than the additional cost
in time and money. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 111-12.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 109-14.
118. In contingency fee cases the lawyer's share of the recovery might be adjusted to pay
for the additional time required. In situations in which an insurance company, the government,
or someone else provides an attorney for the client, the client should still have the right to
control the representation. For the reasons argued in prior sections, client control is an
important aspect of competent representation, and courts should require those who provide
attorneys for others to provide competent representation.
Mark Spiegel poses the problem of non-fee-paying clients who make unreasonable demands
on their lawyers. He suggests, "open confrontation with the choices involved," Spiegel, supra
note 11, at 122-23, but does not suggest a standard by which the lawyer, or ultimately a court,
might resolve the issue if the client does not agree with the lawyer. The general standard that
is proposed herein, which would allocate to the client those choices which the reasonable
client, in the position that the lawyer knows or should know the client to be in, would want
to make, would resolve the problem in a fair manner, if, in such cases, the hypothetical
reasonable client is assumed to be a fee-paying client.
119. See supra notes 22-23.
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are for the lawyer, but it is a standard which they often ignore and which
would be difficult to apply if they did not. The significant development of
the right of client control has resulted from the identification of specific
choices that are for the client. 20
If courts decide to expand the right of the client to control legal
representation, there are two directions that they can take. Courts can
identify, as they have done in medical malpractice informed consent cases,
an intelligible general standard for determining which decisions are for the
client, or they can continue to identify specific decisions that are for the
client.' 2' This section will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
adopting a general standard as opposed to the continued development of
specific rules. It will propose that courts both create a general standard for
identifying decisions that the client should make and continue to identify
specific decisions that, as a matter of law, are for the client.
A. Advantages of a General Standard Rather Than Merely Identifying
Specific Choices That Are For Clients
The identification of specific choices that are for clients, without the
identification of a workable general standard, has several weaknesses. First,
the identification of specific decisions for clients fails to take into consid-
eration the individual characteristics of clients. If courts limit themselves to
identifying specific choices that are for clients, the choices assigned to clients
will be limited to the choices that can be made by the least sophisticated
client. This is illustrated by the choices that courts presently reserve for
clients. The choices' 2 are those which almost any client would be able to
make. Courts cannot reserve more difficult questions for every client because
not every client would be able to make them. Clients have different levels
of sophistication. More sophisticated clients who want to control more
sophisticated questions should be entitled to do so. A general standard can
be formulated to take into consideration the characteristics of the individual
client.
A second problem with rules that identify specific choices for clients is
that they do not take into consideration the facts of specific cases. They
do not give the client the right to make choices that may in a particular
case be very important to the client. Consider the "Long Black Veil" case,
which was posited by David Luban. A criminal defendant does not want
to call an alibi witness, the wife of his best friend, at trial because at the
120. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
121. As discussed supra in text accompanying notes 22-32, although the courts and lawyer
codes speak in terms of an ends/means standard of client/attorney decisionmaking authority,
what they actually do is identify specific choices that are reserved for the client, irrespective
of the ends/means standard.
122. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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time of the crime he was in bed with her.'2 Courts have not allowed clients
to determine what witnesses will be called, 24 but it seems here, given the
importance of the decision to the client, that the client should have the
right to make the decision. 25 Courts may not want to reserve the decision
of what witnesses to call for the client in every case, but a general standard
which reserved for clients those decisions which a reasonable person in the
position the lawyer knows or should know the client to be in, 2 6 would
allow the client to make such a decision.
Finally, the failure of the courts to identify an intelligible general
standard makes it difficult for an attorney to determine who should make
choices that courts have not identified previously as choices for the attorney
or the client. For example, in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Rizzo
v. Haines, an attorney was held liable for the failure to inform the client
of the opposing attorney's statement of his settlement authority and the
judge's opinion of the case's settlement value. 27 No prior case had identified
this as information that the client was entitled to have, nor the choice to
make a counter-offer as a choice the client was entitled to make. The lack
of a workable general standard for determining what decisions are for clients
makes it difficult for attorneys to decide what information and choices they
must give to clients.
B. What General Standard?
If courts are to adopt a meaningful general standard for determining
what choices the client is entitled to make, there are several possibilities.
First, the courts could hold attorneys to the standard of the practice of
others in the profession. This is the standard to which courts generally hold
attorneys'2 and physicians' 29 in malpractice cases.
123. Luban, supra note 24, at 456. The hypothetical is based on the M.J. Wilkin and D.
Dill song:
The judge said, "Son, what is your alibi?
If you were somewhere else then you won't have to die."
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life
For I had been in the arms of my best friend's wife.
Id.
124. See supra note 28.
125. In Luban's opinion: "paternalistic action on the part of lawyers is unjustified" and
lawyers should not override "their clients' competently held values in the name of their clients'
interest." Therefore, in the case of the "Long Black Veil", the client should decide "[w]hat
things are worth dying for?" Luban, supra note 24, at 489.
126. Such a standard is proposed infra at text accompanying notes 147-50.
127. 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). See also infra text accompanying notes 167-82.
128. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 11, and cases cited therein.
129. Courts hold the doctor to the standard of the ordinary member of the profession
within the community. See PROSSER AND KETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 185-186 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON], and the plaintiff must establish the ordinary standard
through expert testimony. Id. at 188.
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Though some courts apply the standard of the profession in medical
informed consent cases, 30 several courts have held that the practice of the
profession should not determine whether the doctor has given sufficient
disclosure.' The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Can-
terbury v. Spence, has given the most thorough justification for not allowing
the medical profession to determine what the doctor should reveal in
informed consent cases,13 2 and its reasoning is instructive for cases concern-
ing control of legal representation.
First, the court points out that the circumstances of each patient is
unique, and therefore, no standard practice within the medical profession
could meet the needs of each patient. 33 The same argument applies to the
question of client choice. Each client is unique, and therefore, no standard
practice within the legal profession limiting the specific choices that are for
the client would be sufficient to protect the interests of clients.
A second justification that the Canterbury court gives for not allowing
the medical profession to set the standard of informed consent is that the
question of what information patients need to make an informed choice is
not a matter of professional expertise. 34 Unlike the standard of care in
many other medical malpractice cases, the issue of what information the
patient needs to make a reasonable choice is not so complex135 that a
layperson is not qualified to determine it. This argument also applies in the
130. See, e.g., Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 440 A.2d 952 (1981); Di Filippo v.
Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Wallace v. Garden City Hosp. Osteopathic, III
Mich. App. 212, 314 N.W.2d 557 (1981), rev'd, 417 Mich. 907, 330 N.W.2d 850 (1983); Bivens
v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp., 77 Mich. App. 478, 258 N.W.2d 527 (1977), rev'd, 403 Mich.
820, 282 N.W.2d 926 (1978). However, some of the courts that apply the standard established
by the profession do not limit the standard to the practice of those within the local community,
as they do in other medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal.2d 749, 205
P.2d 3 (1949); Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 564 P.2d 162 (1977); King v. Williams,
276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973
(1967); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
131. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) (court held that lay witness testimony can competently establish that physician
should have disclosed particular risk information); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
132. The Canterbury court's discussion of whether the medical profession should set the
informed consent standard is discussed in Schneyer, supra note 70, at 150-56.
133. We cannot gloss over the inconsistency between reliance on a general practice
respecting divulgence and, on the other hand, realization that the myriad of variables
among patients makes each case so different that its omission can rationally be
justified only by the effect of its individual circumstances.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784.
134. Id. at 784-85.
135. See, e.g., Note, Physician's Duty to Warn of Possible Adverse Results of Proposed
Treatment Depends Upon General Practice Followed by Medical Profession in the Community,
75 HjAv. L. REv. 1445, 1447 (1962) ("highly complex skills are not involved"). But see Note,
Physician Has a Duty to Inform Patient of Risk Inherent in Proposed Treatment, 109 U. PA.
L. Ray. 768, 772 (1971) (medical profession is best qualified to set standard).
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client control cases. The question of what choices a reasonable client would
want to make is not generally a question which requires technical legal
judgment.
Additionally, the Canterbury court suggests that members of the medical
profession have a bias in favor of retaining control and the law should not
allow them to determine what information they will convey.'36 Lawyers also
are likely to have a bias in favor of retaining control of legal representa-
tion. 37 The custom of the legal profession as to client decisionmaking
authority should be treated as custom generally is treated; it should merely
be admitted into evidence, 3 ' and should not establish the controlling stan-
dard.
Bellow and Moulton present another possible standard for the allocation
of decisionmaking authority. They state that attorneys make "technical
decisions" and that clients make "decisions that affect the client's inmost
concerns.' '1 39 They offer two justifications for such a dividing line, each of
which seems to focus on a different aspect of the word "technical." First,
they suggest that some issues "are too 'technical' for a layperson."' 4 Here,
"technical" is used in the sense of "difficult." Though the difficulty of
the decision is an important factor in determining whether the client should
make it, some difficult questions may be so important to the client that the
client should make them, even though they require the lawyer to give the
client a substantial explanation.
Second, Bellow and Moulton state that:
In the giving of legal advice... a distinction is recognized between
the "important" decisions-those which affect the client's inmost
concerns-and decisions which involve more or less technical aspects
of the client's problem.'
4'
Here "technical" appears to mean those decisions that merely implement
the client's choices, and is contrasted with those decisions that "affect the
client's inmost concerns." Although the importance to the client of the
decision is a very relevant factor in deciding whether a decision should be
allocated to the client, there are problems with an "inmost concerns"/
technical standard. One objection is suggested by the term, "inmost con-
136. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784. Schneyer suggests that this is the most influential
argument of the court. See Schneyer, supra note 70, at 155.
137. As Judge Learned Hand said concerning another profession, the law should not
allow the custom of a group to establish the standard of care because "a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices." The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d
737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
138. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 129, at 193-95.
139. G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 6, at 1030-31. It is not clear whether they
advocate this as a standard or merely describe what they perceive to be the prevailing practice.
Spiegel has suggested that the Bellow & Moulton test is vague. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at
123 n.345.
140. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 6, at 1030.
141. Id. at 1031.
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cerns." The proposed standard appears to be entirely subjective. Courts
should not require attorneys to allow clients to make decisions that are
important to the client unless attorneys know or should know of the
importance of the decision to the client. 142 Also, an "inmost concerns"/
technical standard would not resolve whether the lawyer or the client should
make many of the choices that arise. Many issues are merely of some
concern to the client and involve some technical difficulty; this standard
does not identify who should make such choices.
Mark Spiegel suggests that courts allocate the responsibility for deci-
sionmaking based on the interests of the client, the attorney, and society.
43
The lawyer codes, of course, protect some of the interests of society by
limiting the options of the client. As to choices involving the interests of
society that the professional codes does not resolve, Spiegel suggests, as
argued herein, that lawyer control might result in decisions that are less in
the interest of society than client control. 44 As between the lawyer 45 and
the client, an interests standard apparently would leave almost all decisions
to the client, because the client will have the greater interest in almost all
decisions in legal representation. 46 However, an interests rule would be
impractical in light of the many decisions that must be made in the course
of legal representation.
The law of medical informed consent may give help in the development
of a general standard for identifying the choices that the client should
make. Most courts require that doctors disclose "material risks. ' 147 In
Canterbury v. Spence, the court said:
A risk is ... material when a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
142. The general standard that is advocated herein would hold attorneys responsible only
if they know or should know of the importance of the choice to the client. See supra text
accompanying notes 147-50.
143. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 117-23. Rather than replace the ends/means standard
with "another definitional categorization," Spiegel suggests that courts "begin to consider
specific lawyering decisions and allocate them either to the lawyer or client in accordance
with" their interests. Id. As argued supra at text accompanying notes 121-26, the problen
with merely allocating specific decisions to the client or lawyer is that this does not take into
consideration the individual characteristics of the client or the case. A general standard that
does take into consideration individual characteristics of the client is suggested infra at text
accompanying notes 147-50.
144. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 120-21.
145. Spiegel suggests that lawyers' interests are protected by their right to withdraw from
representation. See id. at 126-32.
146. Spiegel suggests that some decisions will be for the attorney under this division of
authority. "Even if the client chooses the witnesses to be called at trial, the lawyer still
determines the order of proof and the details of eliciting testimony, including the framing of
questions." See id. at 125. What questions to ask a witness may, however, be very important
to the client. One of the client's goals may be to maintain a good relationship with a witness.
147. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1972); Berkey v. Anderson,
I Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676
(1972).
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be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in
deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."'
' 4
This materiality standard establishes the information that the doctor must
convey to the patient. It can be used to formulate a standard, not only for
the information that lawyers should convey to the client, but also the choices
that the lawyer should allow the client to make. Courts should require
lawyers: 1) to do a reasonable amount of client interviewing to determine
if the client has any special needs or interests; 2) to allow the client to
make those choices which a reasonable client, in what the lawyer knows or
should know the position of the client to be, would want to make; 3) to
enable the client to make the choices intelligently; 49 and 4) to communicate
to the client in a manner that will enable the client to comprehend the
choices that he or she must make.Y0
In determining what decisions a reasonable client in the position of the
client would want to make, the attorney should take into consideration the
following factors: 1) the effect that the choice may have on the client; 2)
the complexity of the matter to be resolved; 3) the sophistication, experience,
intelligence, and knowledge of the client; and 4) the interest that the client
expresses. Each of these factors is important in determining the importance
to the client of control over choices and the ability of the client intelligently
to make those choices.
Note that the standard for determining what choices the client should
make is objective in some respects and subjective in others. The standard
is objective in that the lawyer is only required to allow the client to make
those choices that a reasonable client would want to make. This limits, to
some extent, the autonomy of the client, but such a limitation is necessary
so that a lawyer will be able to comply with the standard. The standard
should not require the lawyer to be a mind reader. The proposed standard
is subjective in that the lawyer must attempt to determine whether there are
special characteristics of the client that would lead the client to want to
make choices that an ordinary client would not want to make. Attorneys
cannot avoid responsibility on the basis that they made the choice that a
reasonable client would have made.
C. The Continued Identification of Specific Choices For the Client
Though, as argued in a previous section,' there are advantages to a
general standard for determining the choices that are for the client, there
are also advantages to the identification of specific choices that are for the
148. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed
Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAiH. L. REV. 1396, 1407-10 (1967)).
149. Binder & Price provide a helpful method for enabling the client to make informed
decisions. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 6.
150. See Simpson, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical
Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 172, 183 (1981).
151. See supra text accompanying note 122-27.
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client. When courts identify specific choices that are for the client as a
matter of law, attorneys do not have to wrestle with whether clients should
make these choices, nor does the finder-of-fact, in a malpractice action,
have to wrestle with whether or not the attorney should have allowed the
client to make them.
52
Courts are not limited to either establishing a general standard for
decisions that are for the client or identifying specific choices that are for
the client. They can do both. They should require an attorney to allow a
client to make choices which a reasonable client, in the position that the
attorney knows or should know the client to be in, would want to make.
Courts should supplement such a general standard with rules of law that
require the lawyer to allow the client to make choices in specific situations. 53
They should continue to reserve specific choices for the client which are
generally of great importance to clients and which clients generally are
capable of making. 54 The following section identifies several choices as
likely next steps in the development of the client's right to control legal
representation.
V. NEXT STEPs TOWARD CLIENT CONTROL: THE CLIENT'S RIGHT TO
CONTROL NEGOTIATION AND TO PURSUE ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION
As argued in the prior section, attorneys should have a duty to allow
clients to make those decisions that a reasonable client, in what the attorney
152. In medical informed consent cases, courts have not generally identified specific
choices that are for the patient. It would be more difficult for courts to do so in the medical
informed consent cases than in the client choice cases for three reasons. First, the choices that
courts explicitly give to clients in legal representation are major choices that arise very often.
With only a few rules, courts have been able to take care of a great many of the client choice
cases that arise. Courts could not do this in medical cases. There are innumerable medical
procedures that doctors perform, and courts would have difficulty listing a few specific rules
that would identify what choices the patient should have in a substantial number of cases.
A second reason that courts might be more hesitant to adopt rules of law specifying the
disclosure required in medical informed consent cases is that judges are not experts in the
medical field. However, most of them have been practicing attorneys. They can determine
from their own experience what legal representation questions would be appropriate for the
client.
Finally, it would be difficult to establish specific standards for the medical profession
because the risks of and alternatives to medical procedures are always changing. What is
reasonable disclosure one day will be unreasonable in light of newly developing alternatives to
treatment. This can be contrasted with legal representation, in which the risks of a jury trial
or a criminal defendant taking the stand probably have not changed substantially since early
common-law days.
153. Whether or not courts adopt a general standard, they will probably continue to
identify choices that lawyers must allow clients to make. As argued infra at text accompanying
notes 183-200, courts should explicitly require that the following decisions be made by the
client: what style and strategy to adopt in negotiation, whether to make settlement offers,
what offers to make, when to make them, and whether to pursue mediation or arbitration of
a dispute.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
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knows or should know to be the position of the client, would want to
make. However, the right of client control has developed to this point as
the right of the client to decide specific issues that arise during represen-
tation, and, whether or not courts recognize a broad general right on the
part of the client to make significant choices within legal representation,
courts should continue to identify specific choices that are for the client.
It is likely that the next steps in the development of a duty to allow
clients to control representation will be the recognition of duties to allow
the client to make significant decisions concerning negotiation and to allow
the client to choose alternatives to litigation. First, during negotiation, in
addition to the right to choose to accept or reject a settlement offer, the
client should have the right to choose the style and strategy of negotiation,
when to make settlement offers, and what to offer. Second, the client
should be allowed to choose whether to attempt to resolve disputes through
mediation or arbitration. Each of these choices presents potential benefits
and risks to clients and clients should be informed of the risks and benefits
of each option and allowed to make the choices in light of them.
A. The Client's Right to Control Negotiation
1. The Interests of the Client in Negotiation Decisions
The outcome of negotiations is generally of great importance to clients
in legal representation, whether the lawyer is negotiating a transaction or
the resolution of a dispute. In negotiation of a transaction, if a favorable
agreement is lost because the lawyer does not involve the client in decision-
making, then the client has lost the benefit of the favorable agreement. In
negotiation of a dispute, avoiding litigation can have several potential
advantages to the client. It can limit uncertainty, speed resolution, and
enable the parties to tailor a settlement to meet their special needs. 155 If an
attorney fails to negotiate a settlement that could have been obtained had
the client controlled the negotiation, the case is tried, and the client loses,
the client has lost the benefit that the client would have had if the parties
had settled.
Many decisions that are made during negotiation are likely to affect
the outcome. Some choices enhance the likelihood that a settlement, if
obtained, will be favorable to a client, but also create a greater risk of
deadlock. It is the client that will suffer the most significant loss if there
is a bad settlement or if there is a deadlock, and the client should control
the significant decisions during negotiation.
2. Negotiation and the Lawyer's Conflict of Interest
Courts require a lawyer that is representing both a defendant in a civil
case and the defendant's liability insurance company to provide the defen-
155. See Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. Rnv.
1421, 1423 (1984).
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dant with a substantial amount of information that will affect the decision
whether or not to settle. The attorney must:
advise and counsel a client as to all facts, circumstances and
consequences which are necessary to enable the client to make an
informed decision on matters such as the likelihood of an excess
verdict and the desirability of attempting settlement within the policy
limits. 5 6
This duty is based on the conflict of interest between the insurance company
and the defendant, both of whom are clients of the attorney. 57 However,
this is not the only situation in which a conflict of interest is likely to
interfere with an attorney's decisionmaking during negotiation. Often, there
is a conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client in negotiation
decisions, and the lawyer should always have the responsibility to allow the
client to make significant negotiation decisions. 58 Conflicts of interest
between the lawyer and the client during negotiation are both likely to arise
and likely to affect the lawyer's actions.
Several types of conflicts of interest are likely during negotiation of a
dispute because lawyers have a great interest in whether or not a case is
litigated, and the lawyer's interest often differs from that of the client.
First, the financial arrangements between the attorney and the client may
create a conflict of interest. If lawyers are handling a case on a contingency
fee basis, it is generally in their interest to get a quick settlement, even if
substantial negotiation or litigation might generate a larger recovery for the
client. 59 Second, the workload of the attorney may create a conflict of
interest. If lawyers are overworked, it will be in their interest to settle cases
quickly, whereas if they are underworked and they are employed on an
hourly basis, it will be in their interest to negotiate for a longer period of
time or litigate.160 Third, potential publicity from the trial of a case may
create a conflict of interest. In some cases, it may be in a lawyer's interest
156. Garris v. Severson, Merson, Berke & Melchior, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204, 206 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (Order not published).
See also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 23, at 430 (citing Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan,
Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1980) (although defense lawyers were
employed by company, insured was also their client; as such, lawyers owed duty to client
independent of insurance policy to obtain client's permission to settle claim); accord Lieberman
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980)).
157. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 23, at 430 (citing Rodgers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan,
Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1980)).
158. A previous section discussed the risk that lawyers will have conflicts of interests with
their clients that will affect the results of the representation. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-65.
159. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 11, at 96-99 ("[F]or all but the largest claims, an
attorney makes less money by thoroughly preparing a case and not settling it early." Id. at
105); see also Clermont & Currivan, supra note 62, at 536.
160. See Strauss, supra note 11, at 329-30 ("[t]he attorney's concern about his or her
time, profit, and other personal interests affect, perhaps subconsciously, the choices made for
the client.").
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to litigate a case and get some publicity, rather than negotiate a settlement.' 6,
In cases that lawyers are likely to lose, they may be tempted to settle rather
than risk negative publicity. Finally, the interest of the lawyer in developing
a reputation for handling cases in a certain manner may run counter to the
interest of the client. For example, a lawyer may want to develop a
reputation for hardball negotiation, and may not want to undercut that
reputation by taking a conciliatory approach, even when a conciliatory
approach would be in the interest of the client.
In addition to the likelihood that the lawyer and client will have a
conflict of interest in negotiation, a conflict of interest is more likely to
influence the attorney's actions in negotiation than in litigation. Whereas
litigation takes place in public, in front of the client, the judge, and, in
some cases, the press, negotiation generally take place in private between
the attorneys. During negotiation, the client is not present to oversee the
behavior of the attorney, and attorneys do not risk bad publicity from a
performance that is influenced by their own interests. An attorney for the
opposing side is likely to be more than happy to quietly take advantage of
an attorney that is ineffective because of a conflict of interest. The effects
of these conflicts of interest can be diminished if the client has the right to
make the significant negotiation decisions.
3. The Ability of the Client to Make Negotiation Decisions
It may be that there is justification for leaving much of the decisionmaking
authority with the lawyer in litigation, where many of the decisions are
technical or urgent, 162 but negotiation decisions, generally, are not so technical
or urgent as litigation decisions. Negotiation choices may be difficult, but,
generally, the client can understand the risks and benefits of the alternatives. 63
The lawyer should play an important role in explaining the likelihood of
various results under the alternatives, but lawyers should allow clients to
make the choices in light of their own values and risk preferences.
In many situations, the client may have advantages over the attorney
in making negotiation decisions. The client may know the opposing party
and have a better understanding than the attorney of how that party is
likely to react to various strategic behavior. The client also may have a
better knowledge of some aspects of the subject over which the parties are
negotiating. This knowledge may enable the client to think of creative means
of arranging a deal or settling a case that will benefit both sides.'"
161. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 487, 555 A.2d 58, 64 (1989) (court found
that lawyer wanted case to go to trial, rather than settle, so that he could get "a reputation
as a negligence attorney").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. However, as this article argues supra at
text accompanying note 90, the client should be involved in many litigation-related decisions.
163. For a discussion of some of the negotiation decisions that courts should reserve for
clients, see supra text accompanying notes 183-200.
164. An initial decision that attorneys often do not even consider is the question of who
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These abilities justify client control of negotiation decisions.1 65
4. Beyond the Settlement Offer Precedent
Courts have established that lawyers must have client authority before
they make settlement offers and that they must present settlement offers to
clients. 66 This right is justified by the importance of the decision to the
client and the likely conflict of interest between the lawyer and the client.
The settlement offer rules, however, do not sufficiently protect the interest
of clients in controlling settlement choices. There are many other choices
that are made during negotiation that are important to the client.
A decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1989 suggests a
willingness on the part of courts to broaden the choices attorneys must give
to clients during negotiation. In Rizzo v. Haines,167 the plaintiff had been
injured when a Philadelphia police car struck the plaintiff's car in the
rear. 6 The plaintiff was paralyzed. 69 Plaintiff, represented by an attorney,
brought suit against the city of Philadelphia.170 During the course of a
settlement conference, the trial judge suggested a settlement figure of
$550,000.171 Plaintiff's attorney immediately rejected this figure. 72 Later,
during the course of the trial, the attorney for the city told plaintiff's
attorney, "Look, I've got more than 550, what do you really want," to
which plaintiff's attorney's only reply was "$2 million," the amount of the
plaintiff's previously rejected offer.173 The plaintiff's attorney never dis-
cussed the judge's suggested settlement figure or the city attorney's statement
of authority with the plaintiff. 74 "[T]here was also evidence that [plaintiff's
attorney] considered the opportunity to try the case to be a cornerstone in
building his reputation as a successful plaintiff's attorney."' 75 The case was
tried and the jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict of $450,000.176
does the negotiating. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in having direct
negotiation between the parties to a business dispute. Such negotiations can yield superior
results to those conducted by the lawyers because the parties to the dispute are more familiar
than their attorneys with their business and can respond more quickly and creatively to
proposals. They can look at the complete business picture, unconstrained by the parameters
imposed by legal doctrine. See Lieberman & Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. Ray. 424, 429-30 (1986).
165. It is unlikely that an attorney will be held liable for the failure to present the option
of client negotiation to a client because the practice has probably not yet received sufficient
publicity for a court or jury to conclude that the reasonable attorney would present such an
option to the client.
166. See supra cases cited at note 32.
167. 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989).
168. Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 488, 555 A.2d at 60 (1989).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 492, 555 A.2d at 62.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 494, 555 A.2d at 62-63.
175. Id. at 495, 555 A.2d at 63.
176. Id.
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The plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against his attorney. In the trial
against the attorney, the city attorney revealed that he had had authority
to settle the initial suit for $750,000.177 For the malpractice cause of action,
the trial court awarded the plaintiff $300,000,17s which represented the
difference between the verdict obtained in the original trial and the city
attorney's settlement authority. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's order, which stated that:
[Plaintiff's attorney] did not properly discuss [the City's] inquiry-
offer with the plaintiff. He did not properly disclose [the trial
judge's] recommendation or [the city attorney's inquiry]. He did
not comply with a duty to properly inform plaintiff and to assure
that plaintiff heard and understood.
7 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also pointed to a policy justification of
encouraging settlement as one of the grounds for its decision.8 0
Though the court cited the rule that the lawyer should convey settlement
offers to a client,'"' that rule, by itself, does not explain the decision. The
city's attorney never gave the plaintiff's lawyer an offer of $550,000,182
much less $750,000. The city's attorney merely stated that he had authority
to settle for $550,000 and requested a counter-offer. The court expanded
the right of clients to be informed of settlement offers to include the right
to be informed of the judge's settlement recommendation, statements by
the other side of their settlement authority, and requests of the other side
for a counter-offer.
Rizzo, however, suggests far more than that the attorney merely must
report to the client the judge's recommendations and the opposing attorney's
statements of authority and requests for counter-offers. If the plaintiff's
attorney had merely told the plaintiff, "The judge suggested settlement at
$550,000, the city attorney said he has authority to offer that much, but
that is not enough money and I said that wasn't enough," it is unlikely
that the parties would have reached settlement. However, if plaintiff's
attorney had informed plaintiff of the judge's and city attorney's statements
and had allowed plaintiff to control the settlement negotiations, it is
177. Id. at 494, 555 A.2d at 62.
178. Id. at 489, 555 A.2d at 61.
179. Id. at 497, 555 A.2d at 64.
180. The court stated:
"[v]oluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor. Judges and
lawyers alike strive assiduously to promote amicable adjustments of matters in
dispute, as for the most wholesome of reasons they certainly should. When the
effort is successful, the parties avoid the expense and delay incidental to litigation
of the issues; the court is spared the burdens of a trial and the preparation and
proceedings that must forerun it.
Id. at 498, 555 A.2d at 65 (quoting Rothman v. Fillette, 503 Pa. 259, 267, 469 A.2d 543, 546
(1983), which quoted Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
181. Id. at 499, 555 A.2d at 66.
182. Id.
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reasonable to assume that the parties would have settled. Implicit in the
court's judgement may be a requirement that clients control significant
negotiation decisions.
5. What Negotiation Decisions For the Client?
Cases have clearly established that the client has the right to choose
whether or not to accept settlement offers from the opposing side, 83 and
that clients must approve of settlement offers that their attorneys make.
Other decisions during negotiations are also sufficiently important that they
should be made by the client.
Assuming that a client wants to attempt to negotiate an agreement or
a settlement, a basic question concerning the conduct of the negotiation
will be what style and strategy to adopt. The style of negotiation is the
interpersonal behavior of the negotiator in dealing with the other side, and
may be either competitive or cooperative. 1' Both competitive and cooper-
ative styles of negotiation can be successful. One study found that:
[E]ffective competitive lawyers are dominating, forceful, attacking,
aggressive, ambitious, clever, honest, perceptive, analytical, con-
vincing, and self-controlled. Effective cooperative lawyer-negotia-
tors, on the other hand, were found to be trustworthy, fair, honest,
courteous, personable, tactful, sincere, perceptive, reasonable, con-
vincing, and self-controlled.'85
Though each style can be effective, each carries its own strengths and risks.
Competitive bargainers are less likely to give away too much, however a
competitive style "generates tension and encourages negotiator mistrust"
and creates a greater risk of deadlock.' 8 6 A cooperative style may not yield
terms that are as favorable to the client, but a cooperative style reduces the
risk of deadlock, requires less negotiation time, and generally produces a
higher joint outcome for the parties.'l The client should have the right to
choose the negotiation style.
Whereas the style of negotiation involves the manner of interpersonal
behavior with the opponent, the selection of a strategy controls the sub-
stantive choices. There are two types of negotiation strategies, adversarial
and problem-solving.'88 Whereas an adversarial strategy assumes that there
is a given pie to be divided and that any concession to the other side will
183. See cases cited supra at note 32.
184. See R. BAsaRss & J. HARBAUGH, supra note 13, at 390.
185. Id. at 391 (citing G. WnAmxs, EracnrvE NEGOTiATION AND SETrIMENT (1981)
(study of lawyer-negotiators in Denver and Phoenix)).
186. Id. at 392 (citing G. WmltAss, supra note 185).
187. Id.
188. Adversarial and problem-solving strategies can be used in combination with either a
competitive or cooperative bargaining style. See id. at 393-97; Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rv.
754, 818 (1984).
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be a loss to the client, problem-solving negotiation attempts to resolve
conflict in a manner that will create a bigger pie and enable both parties
to win. 8 9 Problem-solving negotiators attempt to discover the needs of both
of the parties and, together, create solutions that meet those needs.'9
Bastress and Harbaugh contrast adversarial and problem-solving strategies
as follows:
Adversarials proceed linearly to develop their plans, concentrating
on creating and defending positions along the bargaining continuum.
Planning by problem solvers, on the other hand, focuses on iden-
tifying needs and brainstorming to develop solutions for mutual
gains. Adversarials engage in positional argument while problem
solvers tend to explore interests. Adversarials make offers to which
they appear to be committed. Problem solvers advance proposals
that invite opponents to accept, reject, or modify based on how
the proposals intersect with their interests. Adversarials are more
likely to restrict information flow, problem solvers are more inclined
to exchange data. Adversarials reject the opponents' offers sum-
marily and make concessions along the continuum. Problem solvers
explain why solutions are acceptable or unacceptable in whole or
in part based on a needs analysis. They also seldom make conces-
sions, as their adversarial colleagues do, but instead shift to another
proposal that more completely addresses the parties' mutual prob-
lems. 91
Adversarial and problem-solving strategies each have potential benefits
and risks for the client. Problem-solving negotiation can help both parties
if it enables the parties to develop a creative solution that is mutually
beneficial. If the parties want to have a continuing relationship, it may be
important to each of them that the other benefit from the ultimate resolution
of the dispute. However, if the problem is such that the client's only goal
is to obtain as much as possible of a pie of a given size, then adversarial
bargaining is likely to produce the greater gain. 92 If a party attempts
problem-solving and fails to produce a creative solution to the problem,
that party may have revealed weaknesses to the other side that will be
damaging. The choice of what strategy to employ during negotiation carries
with it risks and benefits for the client, and the client should have the right
to choose the negotiation strategy.
When to make offers and what offers to make are significant choices
during negotiation, 193 especially when the lawyer applies an adversarial
189. See R. BAsmESS & J. HAREAUGH, supra note 13, at 381; FisHEIR & URY, GETTING
To YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GrviNG IN (1981); Menkle-Meadow, supra note
188, at 783-85 & 809-13.
190. See Menkle-Meadow, supra note 188, at 801-17.
191. R. BASTRESS & J. HARBAUGH, supra note 13, at 383.
192. See id. at 402.
193. Rosenthal found that less than 20% of attorneys discuss the initial settlement demand
with the client. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 11, at 113.
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negotiation strategy.'9 The closer a party's offer is to a reasonable settlement
figure, the more likely it is that a case will be settled, but the less favorable
the final settlement figure is likely to be. 95 The party to make the first
concession ,usually does worse in negotiation,'9 and small, infrequent con-
cessions are likely to yield the most favorable results.'9 However, toughness
in granting concessions may result in deadlock. 98 Before attorneys make
offers, they must obtain client approval,'9 but the right of the client is
merely the right to veto any proposed offer. Courts should require lawyers
to inform clients of the risks and potential benefits of various offers and
allow the client to choose when to make offers, and what offers to make.20
194. Rather than focusing on offers and counter-offers the problem-solving negotiator
proposes multiple solutions to the problems of the parties and then discusses with the opponent
how each of them might meet the needs of the parties. See R. BAsTmnss & J. HARBAUGH.
supra note 13, at 501. Once the parties have agreed on the general outline of an agreement,
however, they may shift to adversarial exchanges of offers and counter-offers to determine
the final terms.
195. See id. at 497-99 (unreasonable initial offers maximize client's return, but create "an
extraordinarily high incidence of deadlock"); id. at 520 ("a grudging approach to the size and
the number of concessions results in the maximum payoff to the negotiator," but extreme
levels of toughness create a risk of deadlock).
196. See G. Baa.ow & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYRinG PRocEss: NEGOTIATION 115 (1981)
and studies cited therein.
197. See id.
198. The failure to make a concession could lead to a failure to settle because it carries
with it:
(b) the danger that the opponent will become discouraged and end the negotiation
prematurely;
(c) the danger that one's own side or the opponent will become so committed to an
unviable position that agreement is impossible;
(d) the danger that further maneuvering now will leave too little time in the future
to work out an agreement.
Pruitt, Indirect Communication and the Search for Agreement in Negotiation, 1 J. APPLIED.
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1971), quoted in G. BEILOw & B. MOULTON, supra note 196, at 108.
If [an initial demand] is high enough it will (i) protect counsel from under-
estimations of his or her opponent's minimal settlement point; (ii) conceal counsel's
own minimal settlement point; and (ill) permit counsel to make concessions (and
demand counterconcessions) which still perform these concealment/protective func-
tions.... On the other hand, if the initial demand is too high, it may (i) be
dismissed and have no effect on opposing counsel's decisions; (ii) cause opposing
counsel to believe that threats or other cost-imposing tactics are necessary; (iii)
produce an expectation of deadlock (opposing counsel might then begin preparing
for trial, incurring costs which would later have to be recovered).
G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 196, at 100.
199. See cases cited infra note 32.
200. This article has focused on the right of the client to recover in a malpractice action
against an attorney for the failure to involve the client in decisionmaking in a civil trial, but
the right to make choices concerning negotiation in a criminal trial is also very important.
The criminal defendant's right to be informed of a plea bargain offer is clearly established.
The criminal defendant should also have the right to decide whether to initiate plea bargaining.
See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1982); Harris v. State,
437 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1982).
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B. The Client's Right to Pursue Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution
In recent years, there has been a substantial growth in interest in
alternative means of dispute resolution. 20 1 The major alternatives to litigation
and negotiation are mediation and arbitration.? In mediation, the parties
meet with a neutral third party, generally chosen by the parties, who attempts
to facilitate the parties' negotiation of a settlement. 3 The mediator helps
to facilitate negotiation by helping to define the problem and suggesting
options for its resolution.204 Mediation is like negotiation, in that the parties
must reach agreement for there to be a resolution of the dispute. In many
cases, agreements worked out by the parties through mediation are subject
to the review of counsel before final approval by the parties.
In arbitration, an arbitrator, generally chosen by the parties, conducts
a hearing and resolves the dispute.2°5 The parties generally are represented
by counsel. Arbitration is like litigation in that a third party, the arbitrator,
decides how to resolve the dispute. The ground rules of the arbitration
generally are created by the agreement of the parties. They determine how
many arbitrators there will be, how the arbitrators will be chosen, what
rules of evidence will apply, and whether or not the decision may be
appealed. Courts have generally upheld agreements to binding arbitration. 206
201. See, e.g., J. FOLBERO & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSrvE GumE To
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) [hereinafter S. GOLDBERG]; J. MURRAY, A. RAU & E. SHERMAN,
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 247 (1989) [hereinafter J. MuRAY]; L. RISKIN & J.
WESTBROOK, supra note 6; Edwards, supra note 19; Fiss, supra note 19; Fiss, Out of Eden,
94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Lavorato, Alternative Dispute Resolution: One Judge's Experience,
ARB. J. 64 (1987); Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 29 (1985); McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660
(1985); Nelson, The Immediate Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 PEPPERDNE L.
REv. 777 (1987); Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JusT. Sys.
J. 420 (1982); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29 (1982); Sander, Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
202. Other forms of alternative dispute resolution include the mini-trial (lawyers present
their cases to the principals of institutional clients, who then, with the help of an advisor,
seek to reach agreement) and mediation/arbitration (begins as mediation, proceeds to arbitration
if the parties do not agree). L. RSKm & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 173-88. Each of
these has proven to be helpful in resolving some disputes, but they have not yet become so
common or so widely known that the failure of an attorney to alert clients to their use should
subject the attorney to liability for malpractice.
203. See J. MURRAY, supra note 201, at 247; L. RISKIN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 6,
at 83-90. A mediator facilitates a settlement by controlling the communication and information
exchange between the parties, establishing a positive emotional climate and developing proce-
dures to generate options.
204. See J. MURRAY, supra 201, at 248. Normally mediators attempt to be only facilitators,
and do not interject their views or values, but in recent years some mediators have become
more activist and even promote particular solutions. See id. at 248-50.
205. See L. RISKm & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 3-4.
206. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Bailey v. Bicknell Minerals, Inc., 819 F.2d 690 (7th
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There are risks and potential benefits to both mediation and arbitration.
An attorney should inform the client of these risks and potential benefits
and allow the client to choose whether to pursue these means of dispute
resolution. 207
1. The Potential Benefits and Risks to the Client of Mediation and
Arbitration
Mediation and arbitration may differ from litigation in time required
before resolution of the dispute, cost, effect on the future relationship of
the parties, likely result, and procedural protections.
a. Time and Attorneys' Fees
Mediation and arbitration may save the client both time and money.2"8
They can save the client time in two respects. First, the parties generally
can arrange to have the dispute mediated or arbitrated at a much earlier
date than they could have a trial. In litigation, the delay between the filing
of a complaint and the trial of a case can be substantial. For example, in
1985, in Los Angeles County Superior Court it took an average of thirty-
six months for civil cases to get to trial.209 Parties can begin to mediate or
arbitrate a dispute as soon as they agree on a mediator or arbitrator and
arrange for a meeting.
210
Mediation and arbitration can save the client time in a second respect.
Once one of these methods of dispute resolution begins, it may require a
shorter amount of attorney and client time than litigation or attorney
Cir. 1987); O'Mailey v. Wilshire Oil Co., 59 Cal.2d 482, 381 P.2d 188, 30 Cal. Rptr. 452
(1963); Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, AFL-CIO v. Thriftimart, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 421, 380
P.2d 652, 30 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1963); Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal.2d 169, 363 P.2d
313, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1961).
207. Implicit in the suggested duty of the attorney to involve the client in decisionmaking
concerning alternatives to litigation is the assumption that attorneys will know about alterna-
tives. An attorney should know about mediation and arbitration. These methods of dispute
resolution have been widely discussed in bar association journals, as well as in scholarly
publications. See articles cited supra note 201.
208. Pearson, supra note 201, at 435.
209. 1986 JUDiciAL CouNcL OF CALiFoRNA ANNOTATED REPORT, pt. II, table T-17, at
144, cited in Petillion, Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 PEPPERD)NE
L. REv. 929, 931 (1987).
210. Though the parties can arrange for mediation at an early date, if the parties fall to
resolve a dispute through mediation, and then have to get a trial date, the mediation may
delay the resolution of the dispute. The parties can avoid this problem if they set a trial date
and mediate the dispute pending the trial.
Parties can be certain that a dispute will be resolved at an early date if a case is arbitrated.
See L. RisK N & J. WESTEROOK, supra note 6, at 146-47. As with mediation, the parties can
arrange to have a case arbitrated within a short period of time and, unlike mediation, the
parties can be sure that arbitration will result in a resolution of the dispute. The client will
not have the right to reject the decision of the arbitrator, but the client can be confident that
the arbitrator will reach a decision.
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:819
negotiation. In some cases, mediation will resolve a dispute faster than
attorney negotiation, in some cases it will not. Some characteristics of
mediation may expedite resolution of a dispute. When the parties meet
directly with each other during mediation, they can answer each other's
questions and make offers and counter-offers without delay. On the other
hand, during mediation, the parties may spend time dealing with underlying
emotional conflicts that are not related to the specific problem in dispute.
Arbitration generally will require a shorter amount of time than litiga-
tion. The arbitrator is typically an expert in the subject matter of the
dispute, and may understand the facts of the case more quickly than a
judge or jury. 2 I Arbitration results also may not be subject to appeal, and
thus arbitration may prevent the long delay that can accompany appellate
review.
In addition to the potential time savings, the parties may save attorneys'
fees through mediation or arbitration. In mediation, generally, the parties
meet with the mediator, without their attorneys. Negotiations between the
parties during mediation will require less expense than negotiation for a
similar amount of time by attorneys. Mediation requires only one profes-
sional fee, the fee of the mediator, during the time of the mediation.
However, this savings may be offset, to some extent, by the expense of
having an attorney review the agreement. If the mediation is successful, the
parties will probably save money. If the mediation is unsuccessful, however,
the parties will pay the mediator's fees, as well as their future attorneys'
fees.
Mediation creates the largest savings of time and money in cases in
which the parties reach agreement and attorney negotiation would not have
been successful. Of course, it is difficult to tell whether or not any one
case that has been settled through mediation would have been settled through
attorney negotiation, but it appears that mediation is somewhat more
successful at resolving disputes than attorney negotiation. 212 Therefore, if
the parties mediate, the client is likely to save time and money if the
mediation is successful. When the client knows the other party, the client
may be best able to determine whether mediation is likely to lead to an
agreement.
The attorneys' fees in arbitration are likely to be somewhat less than
the attorneys' fees in litigation. In arbitration, attorneys represent the parties
in hearings that are like trials in many respects. The arbitrator is typically
an expert in the subject matter of the dispute, and so the hearing may be
shorter, requiring less attorneys' fees than a trial. 213 However, the parties
will generally have to pay the expense of the arbitrator, and this may reduce
211. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 431.
212. See, e.g., Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Strengths and Weaknesses Over
Time, in ALTERNATIvE MEANS OF FtExLY DisPuTE REsoLUTIoN 57-58 (H. Davidson, L. Ray,
& R. Horowitz eds. 1982).
213. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 431.
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the savings of attorneys' fees created by the shorter hearing. The parties
are likely to have a big savings in time and attorneys' fees if they agree
that the decision of the arbitrator will be final and thereby avoid the expense
of an appeal.
21 4
b. The Future Relationship Between the Parties
Litigation discourages communication and trust between the parties. 21 5
They are adversaries: one party wins, the other party loses, and victory is
reduced to a money judgment.2 6 Litigation is likely to increase friction and
animosity between the parties. The friction that litigation creates can be
especially troublesome in commercial cases in which the parties want to
maintain a future business relationship, 2 7 and in child custody cases in
which the parties must maintain a future family relationship. 21 8
Possibly the greatest value of mediation is that the parties are likely to
have a better future relationship after mediation than after litigation. 219
Whereas litigation and attorney negotiation are likely to inhibit communi-
cation between the parties, one of the central goals of mediation is to create
trust and communication between the parties.? Maintaining a good rela-
tionship with the other party may be important to the client.
c. Results
The likely result if a case is mediated or arbitrated may be better or
worse for the client than the likely result if the case is litigated. Whether,
for an individual client, mediation is likely to lead to a more favorable
resolution than litigation or attorney negotiation will depend on the client,
the other party, the case, and the mediator. Clients with good negotiation
skills, i.e., clients that are intelligent, articulate, forceful, and meticulous,
214. S. GOLDBERG, supra note 201, at 189-90.
215. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 427.
216. See L. RisuN; & J. WaSTBROOK, supra note 6, at 24.
217. Arbitration has flourished in situations in which the parties wish to continue to deal
regularly with each other. J. MuRRAY, supra note 201, at 248.
218. See Lavorato, supra note 201 (Iowa Supreme Court Justice Louis A. Lavorato
discusses damaging nature of litigation in family disputes).
Divorce mediation, in addition to enabling the parties to maintain a relationship, may be
therapeutic. Psychologist Joan Kelly has noted that the mediation process often leads to an
observable reduction in the anxiety, depression and anger that can be generated in divorce.
Kelly, Mediation and Psychotherapy: Distinguishing the Differences, I MEDiATION Q. 33, 36
(Sept. 1983).
On the other hand, there is a danger that if one party has dominated the other party
during the marriage, the pattern of domination will continue during mediation. See infra notes
226-27 and accompanying text.
219. A study comparing separated parents who reached child custody agreements through
mediation with other separated parents found that a substantially higher number of those that
had mediated agreements were in compliance with their visitation and child support responsi-
bilities. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 212, at 59.
220. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 427.
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are likely to do well in mediation. Clients that have poor negotiation skills
are likely to do poorly. If the parties have had a relationship in which one
party has dominated the other party, often the case in a domestic dispute,
the dominant party may have a great advantage. Additionally, the party
with the greater knowledge of the subject of the litigation is likely to do
better in mediation?2' Some mediators will attempt to equalize the bargaining
strengths of the parties, others will not.
2
In some cases, the results of mediation are likely to be better for both
parties than would a result reached through litigation or attorney negotia-
tion. The parties may develop a creative compromise through mediation
that differs from any remedy a court has power to provide.23 Attorneys,
of course, may reach a creative compromise through negotiation,2 but the
parties will often be more familiar than their attorneys with the subject
matter of the dispute and may be more likely to develop a creative
compromise. For example, assume that there is a contract dispute between
two commercial parties. A court may have only the option of determining
which party breached and awarding damages to the innocent party. Attor-
neys may be concerned primarily with the dispute at issue and may attempt
to compromise and settle for an amount somewhere between the likely
result if plaintiff had won and the likely result if the plaintiff had lost.
However, in mediation, the parties may be able to structure a new agreement
in a way that will be beneficial to both parties.225
Studies comparing the attitudes of parties toward litigation and medi-
ation show that the parties are more satisfied with the results that they
achieve in mediation. 6 They are more likely to comply with and less likely
to litigate over agreements that they have reached through mediation.
7
An advantage of arbitration is that an arbitrator may be more likely
to give a correct decision than a judge or jury. The parties can choose the
arbitrator based on experience, expertise in the subject of the dispute, and
reputation for good judgment. The arbitrator's expertise may be especially
beneficial if the resolution of the dispute depends on trade custom and
usage.?8 In a dispute concerning a complex area of business, it may be in
221. See J. MuRRAY, supra note 201, at 292.
222. This advantage may be diminished if the mediator seeks to equalize the power
between the parties, but there is disagreement among mediators over whether this is a proper
role for the mediator. See J. FOLDERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 201, at 185; Lieberman &
Henry, supra note 164, at 431.
223. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 429.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
225. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 156-61, lawyers may have interests
that conflict with the interest of the client in the negotiation process. It may be in the lawyer's
interest to either negotiate a quick settlement or to delay resolution of the dispute. In mediation,
the client is directly involved in the negotiation process and can minimize the effect that the
lawyer's self-interest might have on the results. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 164, at 430.
226. See J. MuRRAY, supra note 201, at 248.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 391.
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the interest of a client who wants a correct decision to have an arbitrator
with a background in the subject area resolve it. 229
d. Privacy
A final advantage to the parties of alternative methods of dispute
resolution is privacy. Mediation sessions and arbitration hearings of private
disputes are not open to the public. The information that the parties convey
in the meetings will not be a matter of public record unless the result later
becomes the subject of a court proceeding. 0 Privacy can be especially
important to parties in a domestic dispute, who consider the matters
discussed to be personal, or to parties in a business dispute, who want to
avoid releasing information that might place them at a competitive disad-
vantage.?
2. Mediation, Arbitration, and the Lawyer's Conflict of Interest
The decision whether to adopt mediation or arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution should be made by clients, rather than by attorneys, not
only because of the risks and potential benefits to the client of each of
these methods, but because lawyers are likely to have a conflict of interest
over whether to pursue alternative methods of dispute resolution.
As to the decision whether to pursue mediation, an attorney's conflict
of interest is likely to be great. Mediation generally is conducted by the
parties, without the presence of their attorneys. The attorneys lose work
because mediation generally does not require as much attorney time as
negotiation or litigation.? 2 Attorneys will also have a conflict of interest as
229. A disadvantage of arbitration may be that it deprives the parties of some of the
procedural and constitutional protections of litigation. See Pearson, supra note 201, at 440.
Generally the parties agree that the arbitrator is not bound by the rules of evidence and that
the decision of the arbitrator is not appealable. An appellate court will not vacate an arbitration
award if the arbitrator is mistaken in interpretation of the law, unless the arbitrator shows a
manifest disregard of the law. See L. RisKiN & J. WEsTBRooK, supra note 6, at 143. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
The present day penchant for arbitration may obscure for many parties who do not
have the benefit of hindsight that the arbitration system is an inferior system of
justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment
and rules of law .... No one ever deemed arbitration successful in labor conflicts
because of its superior brand of justice.
Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986).
230. See J. MuRRAY, supra note 201, at 391.
231. See L. RIsIUN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 148.
232. Leonard Riskin has said:
Legal fees are generally based upon a portion of the amount recovered or on
an hourly rate. Mediation threatens to reduce the amount recovered, because in
settling their dispute, the parties may wish to include nonmaterial considerations:
for instance, to trade money for respect or recognition. The lawyer who is paid by
the hour-to the extent he is motivated by fees-also may view mediation dimly.
Whether the mediation is performed by the lawyer himself or another mediator, it
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to whether to pursue mediation or arbitration if they are not familiar with
these processes. 233 If a client wishes to pursue mediation or arbitration and
the lawyer is not experienced with these methods of dispute resolution, the
lawyer may have to refer the case to another attorney. In light of this risk,
lawyers that are not familiar with alternative means of dispute resolution
will be tempted to avoid presenting clients with these options.
3. Policy Considerations
Courts may be inclined to recognize a cause of action for the failure
to allow the client to choose mediation or arbitration, not only because this
is an important decision for the client, but also because such a cause of
action will encourage mediation and arbitration of disputes. Courts may
want to encourage mediation and arbitration because these methods of
dispute resolution may help to relieve overloaded courts and encourage
reconciliation. On the other hand, alternative means of dispute resolution
may limit the quality of justice. This section discusses each of these
arguments.
a. Overloaded Courts
As noted in a prior section, the delay before a case can be tried may
be substantial.2 4 This delay occurs, in part, because of the great increase
that has occurred in the number of cases that are filed. For example,
between 1960 and 1980, the number of cases filed per capita in the Federal
District Courts nearly doubled. 235 This creates problems, not only for
individual litigants, but also for the legal system. Numerous commentators
and judges have advocated alternative dispute resolution as a means of
relieving the backlog of cases in the court system.
23 6
is likely to save some of the lawyer's time. Thus, the lawyer who brings mediation
into a case that he could handle in an adversary manner will often earn less than
he otherwise would have on that case.
Riskin, supra note 201, at 49.
If attorneys handle arbitration cases, the temptation to avoid arbitration will not be as
great because the parties are generally represented by their attorneys during arbitration.
233. See id. at 49-51.
234. See infra text accompanying note 209.
235. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know And Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious And Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4, 37 (1983).
236. See, Lavorato, supra note 201; McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 201.
Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, speaking to the American Bar Association, said
that reliance on the adversarial process as the principal means of resolving disputes is:
a mistake that must be corrected .... For some disputes, trials will be the only
means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial contest must in time go the way
of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too
destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people.
Address by Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger at the American
Bar Association Mid-Winter Meeting 1984, quoted in Nelson, supra note 201, at 777.
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An example of the effectiveness of mediation at resolving cases quickly
and promptly is the New York "Neighborhood Justice Center" program,
237
in which volunteers from the community mediate interpersonal, neighbor-
hood, domestic, consumer, landlord-tenant, and minor criminal disputes.
2
1
The neighborhood justice centers have been able to resolve a substantial
number of disputes quickly, at a very small cost to the state. 239 It may be
that many of the disputes that such programs resolve would otherwise have
been litigated.
This article advocates the extension of malpractice liability to attorneys
who fal to allow clients the choice of whether to pursue mediation or
arbitration. Adoption of this proposal may initially create some new attorney
malpractice suits. Eventually, however, the number of suits that are avoided
because clients choose to pursue alternative means of dispute resolution are
likely to greatly outnumber the attorney malpractice causes of action that
the cause of action would initially generate. Once courts clearly establish
the right of the client to choose alternative means of dispute resolution, the
number of situations in which attorneys fail to present these options to the
client should greatly diminish.
b. The Value to Society of Reconciliation
The ultimate goal of many advocates of alternative methods of dispute
resolution is not merely dispute resolution, but reconciliation of the par-
ties.2 ° This can benefit, not only the individuals involved,2 1 but society as
a whole. Reconciliation of the parties can reduce the likelihood of future
disputes and prevent conflict from escalating into serious, violent, criminal
confrontation. As noted previously, the New York neighborhood justice
mediation program resolved many disputes that might have otherwise been
litigated. It also may be that without mediation, some of the disputes would
have led to violence.
24 2
237. Sander, supra note 201, at 6.
238. See L. RisiciN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 6, at 84.
239. For the fiscal year ending March 31, 1986, New York's 48 centers handled 18,541
disputes among 60,703 persons. 1985-1986 N.Y., THa ComMUarny DiSPUTE REsOLUTION CENTER
PROGRAM Am. REP., cited in Petillon, supra note 209, at 934. There was successful resolution
of 88% of the cases going to mediation. Id. On the average, the Centers disposed of cases in
14 days from filing to disposition, and the average time required to resolve a dispute was 84
minutes. Id. The average cost to the state was $88.87 per settled case. Id.
240. See McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 201.
241. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20.
242. The report of the New York Neighborhood Justice System, discussed supra at note
239, states:
The dispute resolution process can reduce crime and prevent situations from escalating
into serious often violent criminal matters. It can teach people to manage conflict
constructively in a peaceful, effective manner. If each community has access to a
dispute resolution center, individuals and groups can have a forum for dialogue and
mutual understanding and satisfactory agreements.
Petillon, supra note 209, at 935.
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c. Will Informal Justice Inhibit the Development of Justice?
There is a concern among some legal scholars that alternative means of
dispute resolution will dispense inferior justice243 in three respects. First, it
is argued that alternative methods of dispute resolution create a risk of
injustice in individual cases; the more powerful party might take advantage
of the less powerful party.2" Since mediation often does not rely on
substantive or procedural rules of law or procedure or on other protections
of the adversarial process, less powerful individuals and groups may be
treated unfairly. They may be forced into an inferior settlement because
they need funds immediately or because they cannot afford the expense of
litigation. 24" In litigation, however, judges lessen the impact of inequalities,
for example, by asking questions at trial or inviting amici to participate.
24
Second, beyond the risk that alternative means of dispute resolution
will yield unjust results in individual cases, is the risk that removing cases
from the judicial system will reduce the ability of the system to develop
just rules of law. Courts will not be confronted with the opportunity to
develop precedents that benefit the disadvantaged. This is an especially great
risk if alternative means of dispute resolution become the primary methods
of dispute resolution that are available to the poor. As to many issues,
there is a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law.
247
If the problems of the poor are increasingly handled through alternative
means of dispute resolution, the judicial development of legal rights for the
poor may diminish.2 8
A third argument against alternative methods of dispute resolution is
that through their use, those not responsible to the public may resolve issues
of great significance to the public. One of the values of adjudication is that
it vests the power of the state in highly visible officials who act as trustees
for the public, and are therefore answerable for their actions.249 Owen Fiss
argues on behalf of litigation that the job of the courts "is not to maximize
the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate
and give force to the values embodied in" the lawY 0 Federal Circuit Court
Judge Harry T. Edwards is troubled, for example, by settlement of envi-
ronmental disputes through negotiation and mediation. Negotiation over
environmental protection standards that Congress or a governmental agency
243. L. Risiu & J. WEsTBRooK, supra note 6, at 115. McThenia and Shaffer have
suggested that this argument is based on the assumption that it is the state that dispenses
justice. They argue that justice is not something that people generally get from the state, but
that it is something that people get from each other. See McThenia & Shaffer, supra note
201, at 1664-65.
244. See Fiss, supra note 19, at 1076-78.
245. See id. at 1076.
246. See id. at 1077.
247. Id. at 1073.
248. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 679.
249. Id.
250. See Fiss, supra note 19, at 1085.
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has enacted may yield results that are inconsistent with the rule of law.25
There is a danger that private groups will set environmental standards,
without the democratic checks of governmental institutions.
25 2
Based on these problems with alternative means of dispute resolution,
some have argued that we should not adopt rules that push parties toward
alternative dispute resolution. 253 The proposals advanced herein would not
impose on anyone the duty to engage in alternative methods of dispute
resolution, but it would probably lead to greater use of alternative methods
of dispute resolution and may therefore take some disputes out of the
judicial system.
Nevertheless, clients should have the right to choose how their cases
are handled. If a client wants a case to be handled in a way that will
establish a rule that will be beneficial to society, that should be the client's
choice. But, if a client wants to pursue a method of dispute resolution that
may require less expense, less time, and less conflict, the client should be
able to do So. 254 It may be helpful to consider a medical analogy. In some
medical cases, it might be better for society if a patient underwent a new,
experimental treatment, but, based on the principle of autonomy, we allow
medical patients to control their destiny. The client should control the way
that a case is handled, just as the patient controls the choice of medical
treatment.
C. The Cause-in-fact Issue: What Loss, if Any, Has the Lawyer's
Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and to Pursue
Alternatives to Litigation Caused?
In an attorney malpractice case, the plaintiff must show, not only that
the attorney acted negligently, but that the attorney's negligence was a
cause-in-fact of the client's loss. Even if a client can establish that an
attorney violated a duty to allow the client to control negotiation and choose
other alternatives to litigation, it may be difficult for the client to establish
that the loss of that right has caused a substantial loss.
Even if a lawyer fails to allow the client to control a decision concerning
negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, the client would not have benefited
from the right of control if any of the following would have occurred: 1)
the client would have made the same choice that the attorney made; 2) the
opposing party would not have agreed to the client's proposal to settle,
mediate or arbitrate; or 3) the proposal of the client, if accepted, would
not have produced a better result for the client than the attorney achieved.
Therefore, to recover in a client control cause of action, clients will probably
251. Edwards, supra note 19, at 677.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 19.
254. Owen Fiss has stated that he would "not urge that parties be 'forced' to litigate,
since that would interfere with their autonomy." See id. at 1085. This article argues that to
fail to give clients the option to pursue alternatives to litigation interferes with their autonomy.
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have to show that, given the opportunity, they would have made a different
choice than the one made by the attorney, that the other side would have
agreed to the client's proposal, and that the dispute would have been
resolved under terms that would have been more beneficial to the client
than the result that the attorney achieved. Clients will also have to show
the extent to which they would have benefited had the attorney pursued the
client's choice. This section will consider these requirements.
1. Showing Cause-in-Fact in the Client Choice Cases-Part One: Would
This Client (or Would a Reasonable Client) Have Made a Different
Choice?
Even if clients can show that the attorney should have allowed them to
control negotiation or choose an alternative to litigation, an attorney's
failure to do so has not caused a client any loss if the client would have
made the same choice as the attorney. However, it may be difficult to
reconstruct the decision that the client would have made had the attorney
given the client the opportunity. Courts are faced with similar causation
problems in cases in which an attorney has failed to present a settlement
offer to the client and in medical malpractice informed consent cases.
2 5
1
In the settlement offer cases, courts apply a subjective causation test
and require clients only to show that had the lawyer presented them with
the offer, they would have accepted it.256 This type of subjective causation
test carries great risks for lawyers. At the trial of the action against the
attorney, the client is asked a hypothetical question, "If your attorney had
presented you with this settlement offer, would you have accepted it?" It
is unlikely that even honest clients, answering such a question, would be
ab!e to divorce themselves from the fact that the trial of the case was
unsuccessful and the fact that they will lose the possibility of recovery from
the attorney if they testify that they would have rejected the settlement
offer.
The medical informed consent cases present courts with a similar
causation issue. The majority of jurisdictions have found that a subjective
test, requiring the patient merely to show that he or she would have made
a different choice than the doctor, would unfairly place doctors at the
mercy of the patient's biased speculation.2 7 These courts apply an objective
255. The medical informed consent cause-in-fact problem is discussed in Waltz & Scheune-
man, Informed Consent Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rv.w 628, 649 (1970).
256. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hutto, 414 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Ark. 1976); People v. Mason,
29 Ill. App. 3d 121, 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975); Rubenstein & Rubenstein v. Papadakos, 31 A.D.
2d 615, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 876 (1968) (client denied recovery where she admitted that she would
not have accepted settlement).
A minority of medical informed consent cases apply a similar rule and require that
patients merely show that they would not have had surgery had the doctor told them of its
risks or alternatives. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
257. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98, (1972); Wooley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me.
1980); Macy v. James, 139 Vt. 270, 427 A.2d 803 (1981).
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causation test in the informed consent cases. They require that patients
show, not only that they would have made a different choice, but that a
reasonable patient, knowing of the risk of or the alternatives to the proposed
treatment, would not have had the treatment that caused the harm. s
Courts could, of course, apply a similar objective standard in the client
control cases. They could require that the client show that a reasonable
client would have made the same choice that the client claims that he or
she would have made. However, such a requirement would substantially
limit the right of clients to make their own choices.259 If a court recognized
a right of client choice and then adopted such a causation rule, it would
be taking back with the hand of causation what it purported to give with
the hand of duty. Such a court might as well say that lawyers may choose
for the client as long as they make the choice that the reasonable client
would make. The client would lose the right of autonomy.
On this issue of causation, it does not appear that there is an alternative
to either putting the lawyer at the mercy of the client's less than objective
hindsight under the subjective standard, or significantly undercutting the
right of client choice under the objective standard. As between the two, the
subjective standard is preferable for several reasons. First, for all of the
reasons suggested elsewhere in this article, the client's right to choose is of
sufficient importance that it should not be undercut. Second, lawyers can
protect themselves from the risk that they will be subject to the client's
hindsight by allowing the client to control choices concerning negotiation
and alternatives to litigation. Third, as with some other difficult tort
causation questions, as between an innocent plaintiff and a negligent defen-
dant, the law should err on the side of the innocent plaintiff.u° Finally,
even under the subjective standard the lawyer is not entirely at the mercy
of the client. 6' The trier-of-fact must believe that the client would have
made a different choice if the lawyer had given the client the opportunity,
and it is unlikely that the trier-of-fact will believe that the client would have
made an extremely unreasonable choice.
262
258. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98, (1972); Wooley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me.
1980); Macy v. James, 139 Vt. 270, 427 A.2d 803 (1981).
259. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
23 Cal. App. 3d 313, 100 Cal. Rptr. 98, (1972); Wooley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me.
1980); Macy v. James, 139 Vt. 270, 427 A.2d 803 (1981).
260. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Sindel v. Abbot
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (shifting burden to
negligent defendants to show that they did not cause plaintiff's loss), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912.
261. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 133-36.
262. Doctors have a similar risk under a subjective standard in the medical informed
consent cases. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790; Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 444, 379 A.2d
1014, 1025 (1977).
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2. Showing Cause-in-Fact in the Client Control Cases-Part Two:
Would the Client's Choice Have Yielded a Different Result, and, if so,
What Result?
To show that the lawyer's failure to allow them to control negotiation
and choose alternatives to litigation caused them damages, clients must not
only prove that they would have made a different choice than the attorney
made, but also that the opposing side would have agreed to the client's
proposal, and that the ultimate result would have been more favorable to
the client. The proof required of the client will be somewhat different in
the negotiation and mediation cases than in the arbitration cases.
a. The Negotiation and Mediation Cases: Would the Client and the
Opponent Have Made an Agreement, and, if so, What Agreement?
When clients allege that the lawyer should have allowed them to make
decisions concerning negotiation or allowed them to pursue mediation, they
must show that the opposing party would have agreed to negotiate or
mediate, and that the parties would have reached an agreement that would
have been more favorable to the client than the result the attorney achieved.
Courts confront a similar difficult causation issue when clients allege
that attorneys acted incompetently in litigation.263 In those cases, the trier-
of-fact must determine what result the parties would have achieved had
there been a trial. In the litigation malpractice cases, the courts conduct a
trial-within-a-trial. They retry the issues of the original case, complete with
the evidence that the parties would have presented in the original trial, and
allow the new trier-of-fact to determine how the case would have been
resolved had the attorney handled it properly.2 4
In the client control cases, courts could also allow the plaintiff to try
and reconstruct before the trier-of-fact the result that would have been
achieved had the attorney allowed the client to control the negotiation or
mediation decisions. The client could reconstruct the negotiation or medi-
ation through the testimony of the parties to the initial action. The client
and the opposing party could testify to the offers, counter-offers and
agreement that they would have been willing to make.26 This was the
method that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court permitted in the Rizzo case,
discussed earlier. 266 The court allowed into evidence the settlement authority
263. Some courts in the attorney malpractice cases have placed the burden on the attorneys
to show that their negligence did not cause a loss to the plaintiff. See Moormen v. Wood,
117 Ind. 144, 147, 19 N.E. 739, 741 (1889).
264. See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 23, at 218.
265. There is, of course, a risk that the opportunity to win in the action against the
attorney will affect the client's testimony on this issue.
266. Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (1989). See supra text accompanying
notes 167-82.
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of the opposing party and allowed the client to testify that he would have
agreed to settle for that figure.
2 67
Though courts should allow clients to reconstruct negotiations or me-
diation if they can, often it will be difficult for them to do so for several
reasons. First, in some cases, unlike Rizzo, the opposing party may not
have given his or her attorney any settlement authority, and the opposing
party may find it difficult to reconstruct how he or she would have
responded to various offers. Second, it may be difficult to get the opposing
party to accurately reconstruct the settlement negotiations that would have
occurred. The opposing party may have ill feelings toward the client or the
client's attorney and may be inclined to damage the case of one or the
other. The opposing party may not want to waste further time on the case.
In addition, the opposing party, the opposing attorney, or the liability
insurance company that defended the opposing party in the initial action
may want to preserve the confidentiality of their negotiation practices.
Knowledge of these practices might be a great help to attorneys who oppose
them in future negotiations. Third, after the initial case has been litigated,
it will be difficult to reconstruct the effect that the threat of litigation would
have had on the parties during negotiation or mediation. In both negotiation
and mediation, the threat of impending litigation helps to spur the parties
to settle. Finally, mediators do things with the parties, such as allowing
them to vent emotions, that are designed to prepare the parties emotionally
for reconciliation. It may be impossible to reconstruct the effect of these
methods on the parties after the dispute has been litigated.
Rather than require the client to reconstruct the negotiations or medi-
ation, a court could allow an expert to testify to the result that the parties
would have likely reached had they negotiated or mediated the case. Experts
could base such an opinion on their experience in negotiation or mediation,268
on statistics that show the likely results of negotiation and mediation, and
on the factors that are likely to lead to a successful or unsuccessful result.
In malpractice cases in which plaintiffs allege that the attorney erred at
trial, courts generally have not allowed experts to testify to the result that
likely would have occurred had the attorney acted competently,2 9 but the
difficulties of reconstructing the negotiation or mediation in court may
justify allowing expert testimony as to the likely outcome had the client
controlled negotiation or had the parties mediated.
267. Rizzo, 520 Pa. at 484, 555 A.2d at 58.
268. Rosenthal, in his study of the effect of client involvement on results in automobile
personal injury cases, used a panel of experts including plaintiffs' attorneys, insurance com-
panies' attorneys, and an insurance company adjuster to determine the reasonable value of
cases. D. RosENTHAL, supra note 11, at 37. For a more thorough discussion of the Rosenthal
study, see supra note 57. The parties could use similar experts for the cause of action proposed
in this article. Cf. C. McComcK, HADBOOK ON LAW OF D~sAoas 31 (1935) (before verdict,
value of lawsuit is estimate of value if won times the probability of winning).
269. See C. WoLFRAM, supra note 23, at 218.
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b. The Arbitration Cases: Would the Opponent Have Agreed to
Arbitration and Would Arbitration's Result Have Differed From
Litigation's Result?
When clients allege that the lawyer should have allowed them to pursue
arbitration, they must show that the opposing side would have agreed to
arbitration and that the arbitrator would have made a more favorable
decision than the decision that the court reached in the litigation. It may
be that an arbitrator would have reached a different result than that obtained
through litigation. As argued earlier in this article, parties to an arbitration
are likely to choose an arbitrator that is familiar with their business, and
such an arbitrator may render a better decision than a judge or jury that
is less familiar with it.270
However, it is highly unlikely that, following a trial, a court would
hold that an arbitrator would have reached a different decision than reached
by the trial court. To do so, the court would either have to conclude that
the trial court had resolved the case incorrectly and that an arbitrator would
have resolved it correctly, or that the court had resolved the issue correctly
and an arbitrator would have resolved it incorrectly. A court would be
unlikely to hold that the original court erred due to its lack of expertise
and that an arbitrator would have decided the case correctly. A court might
decide that the original case was lost based on the failure of the lawyer to
properly handle the case, but if that is the client's argument, he or she is
likely to bring a malpractice action based on the attorney's lack of com-
petence at trial rather than the attorney's failure to allow client control. A
court is also unlikely to allow the client to recover based on the theory that
the original court decided the case correctly and that an arbitrator would
have decided it incorrectly. The court would be unlikely to assume that an
arbitrator would have decided the case incorrectly and, even if it did, it
would be unlikely to hold that clients should get the recovery they would
have gotten from an errant arbitrator.
Though clients are unlikely to recover the difference between what they
would have recovered in arbitration and what they recovered in litigation,
it may be that courts will allow them to recover other losses suffered due
to the failure of the lawyer to allow them to pursue arbitration. A big
advantage to the parties in arbitration is that an arbitrator can resolve a
dispute quickly and the parties can avoid the risk of an appeal.27' It may
be that a client, deprived of the right to pursue arbitration, could recover
damages suffered as a result of a delayed trial decision or an appeal from
a trial decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of the client to control the important decisions during legal
representation should be a part of the client's right to autonomy. Client
270. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
271. See supra notes 206, 211 and 214 and accompanying text.
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control will generally yield better results for the client, will limit the effect
of conflicts of interest that accompany the attorney/client relationship, and
will build on the precedent of medical informed consent. Courts should
extend the right of client control, both by giving the client the right to
control those decisions which a reasonable client, in what the lawyer knows
or should know to be the position of the client, would want to control,
and by continuing to identify specific choices that, as a matter of law, are
for the client.
Whether or not courts adopt a general standard of client control, they
should identify the significant choices in negotiation, and the choice whether
to pursue mediation or arbitration, as decisions that are for the client.
These choices are of great significance to clients and are within the com-
petence of clients. Client control over the decision to use alternative dispute
resolution is likely to lead to greater use of mediation and arbitration, a
reduction in the load on courts, and more reconciliation among litigants.
If clients can show that the failure of the attorney to allow them to control
negotiation decisions and to choose mediation or arbitration caused them
to suffer loss, courts should allow them a malpractice recovery.

